ASEAN-Philippine Relations : the fall of Marcos by Gan, Selena Geok Hong
A S E A N -P h ilip p in e  R ela tion s: T he Fall o f M arcos
Selena Gan Geok Hong
A sub-thesis submitted in partial fulfilment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts (International Relations) in the 
Department of International Relations, Research School of 
Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra.
June 1987
11 certify th a t  this sub-thesis is my own 
original work and that all sources used 
have been acknowledged
Selena Gan Geok Hong
1T a b le  o f  C o n t e n t s
A c k n o w le d g e m e n ts 2
A b b r e v ia t io n s 3
I n t r o d u c t i o n 5
C h a p t e r  O ne 14
C h a p t e r  T w o 33
C h a p t e r  T h re e 47
C o n c lu s io n 62
B ib l io g r a p h y 68
2A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s
1 would like to thank my supervisors, Dr Ron May and Dr Harold Crouch, both 
from the Department of Political and Social Change of the Research School of Pacific 
Studies, Australian National University, for their advice and criticism in the preparation 
of this sub-thesis. I would also like to thank Dr Paul Real and Mr Geoffrey Jukes for their 
help in making my time at the Department of International Relations a knowledgeable 
one. I am also grateful to Brit Helgeby for all her help especially when I most needed it.
1 am most grateful to Philip Methven for his patience, advice and humour during 
the preparation of my thesis. Finally, 1 would like to thank my mother for all the support 
and encouragement that she has given me.
Selena Gan Geok Hong, 
Canberra,
June 1987.
3A b b r e v i a t i o n s
A F P A r m e d  F o r c e s  o f  t h e  P h i l ip p in e s
A S A A s s o c ia t io n  o f  S o u t h e a s t  A s ia
A S E A N A s s o c ia t io n  o f  S o u t h e a s t  A s ia n  N a t io n s
C G  D K C o a l i t i o n  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  D e m o c r a t i c  K a m p u c h e a
C o rn e le c C o m m is s io n  o f  E le c t io n s
C P M C o m m u n i s t  P a r t y  o f  M a la y a
C P P C o m m u n i s t  P a r t y  o f  th e  P h i l ip p in e s
E E C E u r o p e a n  E c o n o m ic  C o m m u n i t y
E P C E u r o p e a n  P o l i t i c a l  C o o p e r a t io n
F P D A F iv e  P o w e r  D e fe n c e  A r r a n g e m e n t
K B L K ilu s a n  B a g o n g  L ip u n a n
M N L F M o r o  N a t i o n a l  L ib e r a t io n  F r o n t
N a m fre l N a t io n a l  C i t i z e n s ’ M o v e m e n t  for F r e e  E le c t io n s
N P A New  P e o p l e ’s A r m y
O I C O r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  I s la m ic  C o n fe re n c e
P A P P e o p le ’s A c t io n  P a r t y
P A S P a r t a i  I s la m
P D P P h i l ip p in e  D e m o c r a t i c  P a r t y
P K I I n d o n e s ia n  C o m m u n i s t  P a r t y
R A M R e fo rm  t h e  A F P  M o v e m e n t
U N U n i te d  N a t io n s
U N G A U n i te d  N a t i o n s  G e n e r a l  A sse m b ly
U n id o U n i te d  N a t i o n a l i s t  D e m o c r a t i c  O r g a n i s a t i o n
US United States
ZOPF AN Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
5I n tr o d u c t io n
T he Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been in existence for 
tw en ty  years. It was formed in Bangkok, Thailand  in August 1967. ASEAN now 
com prises six countries, namely, the five founding members: Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand; and A SEA N ’s newest member, Brunei Darussalam, 
which joined in Jan u a ry  1984.
T he  history of Southeast  Asia has been characterised by the failure of regional 
organisa tions. This has been due mainly to  a  combination of old factors such as 
t rad i t io n a l  and historical emnities, as well as new factors such as the conflict between 
regional asp ira tions and the nationalistic desires of member s ta tes  for individual 
m odern ization  and deve lopm en t.1 ASEAN is unique in Southeast Asia because of the 
num ber of years th a t  it has remained in tac t ,  and has been perceived as viable by its 
m em bers. It is the sequel to organisations such as the Association of Southeast Asia 
(ASA), which lasted from 1961 to 1967, and Maphilindo (an acronym for Malaysia,
o
Philipp ines and Indonesia), formed in 1963 but which never truly got off the g ro u n d /
In addition  to the  long period of its existence, ASEAN has also been successful in 
te rm s  of the recognition accorded to it by o ther members of the in terna tional arena. The 
organisa tion  has to some ex ten t atta ined  the economic and social aims listed as the first 
goal of the 1967 Bangkok Declaration, namely:
To accelerate the  economic growth, social progress and cultural development 
in the  region through  jo in t  endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership
^Sandhu ,  Kernial S, ‘T h e  P o ten tia l  of A S E A N ’, in Hagiwara , Yoshiyuki (ed), Asia in the 1980s: 
In terdependence ,  Peace and  D eve lopm ent, (Tokyo. Ins t i tu te  of Developing Economies, 1982),
p p . 111-112.
F o r  an account of why these organisations failed see Pechkam , Danai,  Regional Organisation 
and In teg ra t ion  in S ou theas t  Asia , Unpublished Thesis. C larem ont G ra d u a te  School, 1974, and 
Laird ,  D onald  T, The P hilipp ines in Southeast Asia: T ransactions ,  In teractions and Conflict with 
Indonesia ,  Malaysia, S ingapore and T h a i la n d , U npublished Thesis, University of Michigan, 1975.
6in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community 
of South East Asian Nation(s).''
Its success in this respect can be measured by the ties ASEAN has formed with other 
regional organisations, like the European Economic Community (EEC), as well as with 
major industrial countries like Japan and the United States (US).* 4 ASEAN, moreover, 
has also had success in political terms. ASEAN solidarity increased with the American 
withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975. Two major ASEAN agreements were signed in Bali, 
Indonesia, in February 1976 by the heads of government of the five member states. These 
were the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord. The 
summ it meeting of the five ASEAN heads of government was a success both in terms that 
it had brought together for the first time a meeting of all five leaders, and in the 
cordiality of the atmosphere of numerous bilateral and multilateral negotiations before 
and during the summit. This had the effect of solidifying the ‘spirit of togetherness that 
had originally brought ASEAN together in 1967V’ More recently ASEAN has provided 
united support for the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK).
The Philippines, a founding member of ASEAN, was also involved with the ASA 
and Maphilindo. Significantly, the Philippines was largely responsible for the failure of 
both organisations. This responsibility resulted from its continual bid to reclaim Sabah, 
now a state  of Malaysia, as a part of the Philippines. However, after an initial attempt 
during the early years of ASEAN to renew the claim, the government in Manila down­
played its claim in the interest of ASEAN solidarity and cooperation. The major role the 
Philippines has played in the politics of Southeast Asian regional organisations has made 
the 1986 Philippine political crisis, when long-time leader Ferdinand Marcos was 
challenged and later ousted by Corazon Aquino in February 1986, of immense interest to 
any analysis of intra-ASEAN politics.
o
A S E A N , Association of Southeast Asian Nations, (Second Edit ion ) ,  August 1975, p.85.
4 A SEA N  R eport  U p d a te , Asian Wall Street Journal ,  (Hongkong, Dow Jones Publishing 
C o . ,1980), p p . 113-115.
F a r  E astern  Economic R eview , 5 March 1986, p p .10-11.
C•
uJorgensen-D ahl,  Arnfinn, Southeast Asia and Theories of Regional In teg ra t ion , Unpublished 
Thesis ,  D ep a r tm en t  of In terna t ional  Relations, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian 
N ationa l  University , 1976, p.104.
7The main objective of ASEAN was defined in Bangkok as the creation of
a peaceful, prosperous and resilient community through joint efforts with the 
view of strengthening economic and social stability in the respective countries.^
Clearly, this objective cannot be separated from the problem of political stability within 
each member country. While the socio-economic conditions of each member are to an 
extent dependent on wider regional political conditions, it is also true tha t  the internal 
political conditions of one member can affect other members depending on the level of 
interaction between member nations. As the former Foreign Minister of Singapore, S 
Rajaratnam  declared on January 1, 1971:
Political boundaries not withstanding what happens in one ASEAN country 
can affect the fate of the rest for better or for worse. We are like passengers 
travelling in the same boat. We are separate entities but with a common interest 
- tha t  the boat should not sink lest we all sink with it ... the people of the 
ASEAN region have to operate at two levels simultaneously - they areftindependent nations: they are also interdependent nations.
Indeed, the advent of internal discord within a member nation will always be of 
greater importance to the rest of ASEAN than the occurrence of instability in a country 
outside the organisation. By the same token, internal change or disorder occuring in a 
nation outside ASEAN will be felt by ASEAN members through an insulation layer 
because it would not be a part of the ‘existing patterns of communications and political 
relationships.’^
Political Crisis in Manila
On 21 August 1983, after almost ten years of martial law under Marcos, the return 
and abrupt assassination of Senator Benigno Aquino, one of the President’s major 
political opponents, signalled the begining of a new political era for the Philippines.^  The 
assassination was eventually to lead to a massive popular upsurge against further 
repression by a corrupt political dictatorship. In the short term the investigation resulted
"A S E A N , op.cit. , p.14.
^Ibid. , p.60 .
'^Gordon, Bernard K, ‘Common Defense Considerations and Intergration in Southeast Asia’, in 
Tharp Jr, Paul A, Regional International Organisations/Structures and Functions, (New York, St. 
Martin’s Press, 1971), p.248.
^ Far Eastern Economic Review. 10 April 1986, pp.75-76.
8in further confusion, confirming public suspicion of the involvement of the Marcos 
government and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The Commission of Inquiry 
into the assassination found th a t  Marcos’ righthand man, AFP Chief-of-Staff General 
Fabian Ver, was involved. Although Ver was finally acquitted, the assassination and 
events which followed only served to further damage Marcos’ reputation in the eyes of 
Filipinos, ASEAN, and the rest of the world.
Benigno Aquino’s assassination triggered further pressure by the US on Marcos for 
reform. Washington feared tha t  without the necessary reform the communist insurgency 
would grow to threaten the US bases in the Philippines to the detriment of US policy in 
the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Further, the prospect existed tha t  US economic and 
military aid could be curtailed by the Congress since, as late as December 1985, questions 
were being asked as to the location of some US$100 million of military aid assigned to the 
Philippines. US investigations into the Marcos government were underway.** Feeling 
the pressure from the Americans, Marcos decided to call snap presidential elections in
i  o
early 1986, in the hope of providing himself with a ‘new mantle of ‘legitimacy” . Marcos 
was quite confident tha t  he would win. Martial law had enhanced his executive powers 
and, it seemed, his control of the military. Both the AFP and the Philippine 
Constabulary had been numerically strengthened during the years of martial law. In 
addition, the democratic opposition was disunited. At the same time there was doubt 
whether Marcos would allow the elections to be fair. The Americans were also worried
1 9
about t h i s . 0 They were disappointed with the split opposition and anxious that the 
elections should be as fair as possible.
In early December, the strongest contenders for the elections were Corazon Aquino, 
Benigno Aquino’s widow, and Salvador Laurel, longtime opposition leader and head of the 
United Nationalist Democratic Organisation (Unido). Under pressure from the strong
 ^ ^F ar  Eastern  Economic R eview , 19 December 1985, p.45.
i 2
F ar  Eastern  Economic R ev iew , 21 November 1985, p.53.
13 •Ib id . , p.62. Marcos had previously allowed some fairness in the 1984 B a ta san  P am bangsa  
(National Assembly) elections bu t  th is  had proved em barrassing  for Marcos as the m odera te  
opposit ion won more seats th a n  expected. The  Kilusan Bagong Lipunan (KBL), M arcos’ party , lost 
30% of all seats contested.
9Philippine Roman Catholic Church, Laurel finally agreed to run as a vice-presidential 
candidate against Marcos’ running mate Arturo Tolentino. This move united the 
opposition forces in the last week of December 1986 to the detriment of Marcos. The 
coalition of Aquino/Laurel,
covered a wide spectrum of political forces. On the right stood the 
traditional, conservative Unido political machine, strong in parts of Luzon and 
in the South of the country. Church-affiliated Manila businessmen plus brazenly 
partisan clergy and religious-order members held part of the centre. Alongside 
them stood a Philipino Democratic Party  (PDP) now merged with the Laban 
Party  begun by Aquino’s late husband ... PDP-Laban drew on sources of local 
strength in Luzon, Cebu and parts of Mindanao; ... and because of Aquino’s 
earlier ties to nationalist figures such as former Senator Lorenzo Tanada, even 
some Left-leaning elements found room in the anti-Marcos electoral ticket that 
carried green (Unido) and yellow (Aquino) colours.14
Elections were held on 7 February 1986 with predictions of a close contest. 
Observers of the elections witnessed mass fraud and voter-list manipulation. Confusion 
resulted as the government’s Commission of Elections (Comelec) showed Marcos 
victorious, and the National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel) showed 
Aquino the winner. Marcos had miscalculated Aquino’s popularity and his own evident 
unpopularity. Nevertheless, just  before midnight on 14 February 1986, Marcos’ Kilusan 
Bagong Lipunan (KBL)-dominated Batasang Pambansa (National Assembly) proclaimed 
him President. The official tally recorded 10.8 million votes for Marcos against Aquino’s 
9.3 million. Aquino refused to recognise the official count, contending that the elections 
had been wracked with fraud and tha t  if an honest count had been taken she would have 
won. Aquino then called for a non-violent protest of civil disobedience against Marcos’ 
claim to the presidency. She received crucial support for this action from the Catholic 
bishops of the Philippines.11)
Marcos’ control of the situation was further eroded when, fearing for their lives, his 
Defence Minister, Juan Ponce Enrile and his deputy Chief-of-Staff of the AFP, General 
Fidel Ramos, defected. Reports had reached them th a t  they were to be arrested. The 
AFP was divided, with the Reform the AFP Movement (RAM) faction within the army
14Far Eastern Economic Asia 1987 Yearbook, pp.222-223.
^ ’Far Easter Economic Review . 27 February 1986, p. 11. In a country which is 85% Catholic the 
Church is a formidable force for any government.
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defecting with Ramos and Enrile. This signaled the beginning of further army defections 
from Marcos. A major additional blow came with the US distancing itself from Marcos.1^  
At tha t  time Marcos had not received diplomatic support from any country except the 
Soviet Union. In spite of these events, Marcos hung on, certain that he had President 
Reagan’s support. However, on 25 February a telephone call from Senator Paul Laxalt, a 
close friend of Reagan’s, confirmed that the US would support Aquino. Having lost 
Reagan’s support, Marcos admitted defeat. He and his family were flown out of 
Malacanang Palace a t  9.05 pm on 25 February 1986, to Clark Air Force Base, later to be 
transported by US forces to Guam and thence on to Hawaii.
S tru ctu re
The events of the crisis in Manila were of concern to the other ASEAN leaders. 
Each ASEAN country had its own concerns over the instability in the Philippines, much 
of it reflecting both bilateral and regional issues. Ultimately, the crisis highlighted 
negatively the weakness of intra-ASEAN relations. This subthesis will analyse the intra- 
ASEAN weakness through a study of the bilateral relations of each major ASEAN 
country most concerned with the Philippines, namely Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.
Clearly the recurring nature of the Sabah issue between Malaysia and the 
Philippines, makes it imperative tha t  in any political disorder in the Philippines, 
Malaysia-Philippine bilateral relations should be examined. Chapter One of this 
subthesis will investigate Philippine-Malaysia relations both during and after the crisis. 
The Sabah claim, as well as the existence of the Muslim revolutionary movement in 
Mindanao provide two major factors affecting the brittle relationship between the two 
countries, which adversely affect stability within ASEAN.
Chapters Two and Three will deal with lndonesia-Philippine and Singapore- 
Philippine relations respectively. Both President Suharto of Indonesia, and Prime 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, came to power around the same time as Marcos.
J6Ibid., pp. 12-13.
^"Presiden t S uhar to  came to power in 1967, largely as a result of the a t tem p ted  coup in 
Indonesia known as the G estapu  Affair. P rim e M inister  Lee Kuan Yew came to power in 1959, bu t 
only becam e P rim e M inister of an independent s ta te  in August 1965. Marcos was inaugura ted  
President in the Philippines on 30 December 1965.
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They have had a long association with him. This subthesis will therefore analyse the 
effect of a leadership change and subsequent crisis in the Philippines upon the attitudes of 
the two leaders and their governments.
The question of leadership change is especially significant for Southeast Asia. In a 
region where most, if not all, of the states are highly authoritarian in nature, foreign 
policy is determined by a narrow clique of elites surrounding the leaders. A change in 
leadership can sometimes result in a change in foreign policy, which in turn could portend
i o
instability within the region. An example of this can be seen in the case of Philippine 
President Macapagal. It has been stated tha t  one factor which led to the failure of ASA 
as a regional organisation was Macapagal’s lack of interest compared with his 
predecessor, Garcia.*0 Similarly, the personalities of leaders play a large part in the 
foreign policies of ASEAN states. A measure of volatility exists when uncertainty persists 
as to whether a country’s key individuals will disappear from the scene.
This level of unpredictability is particularly worrisome to the other ASEAN leaders 
in view of their staunch anti-communist stance. The Philippine domestic political scene 
seems particularly unstable vis-a-vis encroaching communist influence. It is the only 
ASEAN country where there is a sizable communist movement in the countryside. 
ASEAN concern on this m atter  can be traced in the agreements reached in Bali in 1976. 
The declaration of principles governing ASEAN relations called on each member country 
to ‘eliminate threats posed by subversion to its stability, thus strengthening national and 
ASEAN resilience.’20
Chapter Four will investigate wider ASEAN-Philippine relations in order to provide 
a better understanding of the intra-regional politics of ASEAN in view of the above 
factors. The strength and cohesion of ASEAN in the face of an external threat is well-
i  o
Jorgensen-D ahl,  o p .c i t . , p p .311-316.
*°lbid.) p.125.
9Q
Y ah u d a ,  Michael,  P a t te r n s  of Regionalism in Asia: New O pportun it ie s  for the  1980s, Flinders 
U niversity  Asian Studies Lecture 14, 1983, p.19.
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o  t
known and well-documented. However, the internal threats of political disorder and 
traditional antipathies are less well-known. Evidently, even after the twenty years of its 
existence, ASEAN has not yet achieved the kind of integration developed by other
o o
regional organisations, such as the EEC.
For the purposes of this work, the two other ASEAN countries, Thailand and 
Brunei, will not be dealt with individually. Their reactions and concerns will be included 
in the final chapter and conclusion covering wider ASEAN-Philippine relations. This is 
primarily because Thailand has few, if any, major disputes or problems in its bilateral 
relations with the Philippines. Moreover, Thailand is geographically distant from the 
Philippines compared with the other ASEAN countries. Its major concern is with the 
Indochinese stalemate a t  its borders. Brunei is relatively new to ASEAN. Its foreign 
policy is aligned to tha t  of Malaysia and Singapore. Any reaction or concern on the part 
of either Thailand or Brunei would simply reflect the ASEAN line.
The Philippine political crisis, a major domestic crisis in an ASEAN country, has 
served to illustrate the internal weakness of ASEAN. ASEAN was acutely concerned but 
was unable in any way to influence the confusion in the Philippines. Unlike the US it had 
no major input during the entire presidential election period. Evidently, US support, 
decisions and advice were sought after and had more of an impact on the elections and 
their afterm ath, than did the position of any ASEAN member country. Although Marcos 
was declared victorious on 14 February 1986, ASEAN did not announce its support for 
either candidate. Indeed it was only on 23 February that ASEAN issued a joint statement 
of concern regarding the situation in the Philippines. The concluding chapter of this 
subthesis wdll critically examine the extent of integration within ASEAN, the degree of 
each member's concern, why they reacted as they did to the crisis, and finally the extent
9 1
A SEA N  resilience and solidarity  has been responsible for the continued seating and increasing 
nu m b e r  of votes in favour of the  G G D K  a t  the  United N ations (UN) since 1979. Votes at the last 
U N G A  on the ASEAN resolution on K am puchea  was the highest since 1979 with 115 votes for the 
resolution and 21 against .  ASEAN N ew sle tte r , S ep tem ber-O ctober  1986, p.8.
M a tsu m o to ,  Shigekazu, ‘T h e  S tru c tu re  of In terdependence in Southeast Asia and the  F u tu re  of 
the A SEA N  S ta te s ’, in H agiw ara ,  o p .c i t . , p p . l  19-120. In te rm s of the volume of in tra regional trade, 
A S E A N ’s had been very low com pared  to the  EEG. ASEAN trades more with outside countries like 
J a p a n  and the  US than  am ong  themselves.
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to which they sought to or could influence events in the Philippines. Perhaps after all 
ASEAN cannot be expected to conform to the integrative style of Western regional 
organisations, to sustain institutions equivalent to the European Parliament and the 
organisation of European Political Cooperation (EPC) maintained by the EEC. 
Integration within Southeast Asia is more likely to remain of a different character with 
newly independent states, fiercely nationalistic, fully aware of and sensitive to their
9 9territorial integrity and sovereignty. °
23Jorgensen-Dahl,  op.cit,., pp.4-5.
14
C h a p t e r  O n e
M a l a y s i a  - P h i l i p p i n e  R e l a t i o n s
In trod u ction
The history of relations between Malaysia and the Philippines has been one of 
conflict since the formation of the Federation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963. 
Specifically, it has been the Philippine claim to Sabah, one of the thirteen states that 
make up the Federation of Malaysia, th a t  has soured relations between the two countries. 
Although both countries are now members of ASEAN, bilateral relations have remained 
cool and formal. All Malaysian official visits are banned unless they are on ASEAN 
business. Further, no Malaysian prime minister has made a trip to the Philippines since 
the Philippine claim to Sabah. The difficulty of solving this conflict has increased over the 
years as a separate issue has complicated the Philippine ‘terra irredenta’ attempt. The 
Filipino Muslim separatist movement has become embroiled in the conflict, as many rebel 
Muslim Filipinos have received training, support and refuge in Sabah and other parts of 
Malaysia. Sabah has at present about 100,000-120,000 Filipino Muslim refugees in its 
territory. These two related issues plagued Malaysian-Philippine relations throughout the 
presidency of Ferdinand Marcos and have yet to be finally resolved. This chapter seeks 
first, to briefly explain the history of relations between the two countries since the 
Philippines first officially claimed Sabah as Philippine territory in June 1962. The major 
part of this history concerns Malaysian experiences with Marcos on the two issues 
ment ioned above. Malaysia’s a ttitudes and preferences during the Philippine crisis which 
led to the fall of Marcos had their origins in their reaction to Marcos’ treatment of these 
two issues. Secondly, this chapter will deal with the reasons why Corazon Aquino was 
preferred by the Malaysians.
15
The Sabah Claim
The quarrel between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah concerns the question 
of whether in January  of 1878 the Sultan of Sulu, Mohammed Jamalul Alam, leased or 
ceded the territory. The Sultan leased or ceded the territory to two private citizens, 
Gustavus Baron de Overbeck and Alfred Dent ‘together with their heirs, associates, 
successors and assigns, forever and or until the end of t im e /1 The Sultan was to receive 
five thousand Straits  dollars annually for this lease or cession. Overbeck eventually sold 
out to Dent in 1880. Dent then secured the granting of a Charter of Incorporation from 
the British Government in 1881, which began the British North Borneo Company. 
Britain established a  formal protectorate in 1888, and assumed direct administration of 
the territory from the North Borneo Company in July 1946. Earlier in March 1885, Spain 
had signed a protocol which renounced any claim to North Borneo in return for British 
recognition of Spanish sovereignty over Sulu. This protocol was in turn accepted by the
o
Americans when they took over the Philippines from the S pan ish /
With the formation of the Federation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963, Malaysia 
inherited the United Kingdom’s sovereignty over Sabah. The basic issue, however, 
remains as to whether Sabah belongs to the Philippines or to Malaysia. The confusion lies
o
in the translation of the Malay word ‘padjakV' The Philippine government maintains 
th a t  the word means ‘lease’ while the Malaysian and British governments translate it as 
‘cede’.'* 
It is significant tha t  it was only in June 1962 that President Diasdado Macapagal of 
the Philippines made the first formal assertion tha t  Sabah was part of the the sovereign 
territory of the Philippines. The significance of his declaration lies not in the conclusion 
tha t  the Philippine claim was a whim on the part of Macapagal but rather with the
^Leifer, Michael, T he  P h i l ipp ine  Claim to S a b a h , Hull M onographs on Southeast Asia, No 1, 
(Switzerland, Cen tre  for S ou theas t  Asian Studies, University  of Hull, 1968), p.4.
" Ib id . , pp.3-6.
°Ariff, M O, T he  P h i l ip p in e s’ Claim to Sabah: Its Historical, Legal and Political Im plications, 
(K ua la  L u m pur ,  Oxford U niversity  Press, 1970), pp.1-3, and p.34. Ariff lists other legal 
com plications  of the issue which do not concern the  political aspects of the  claim examined here.
*Kaul,  M an Mohini, T he  Philippines and S ou theas t  Asia, (New Delhi, R a d ia n t  Publishers, 
1978), p p .75-76.
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change in P h ilip p in e  fore ign po licy  w hich  occured a t th a t tim e . The prospect o f a c la im  
had exis ted  since the  P h ilip p in e s  became independent in  1 9 4 6 . However ,  P h ilip p in e  
fo re ign  po licy  was centred on the U n ited  States to  the  d e tr im e n t o f any rea lisa tion  o f an 
Asian  id e n t ity  by the  P h ilip p in e s . In tu rn , because o f th is  special re la tio n sh ip  and 
dependence on the  US fo r bo th  econom ic and security  m a tte rs , in the eyes o f o the r Asians 
the F ilip in o s  ‘ enjoyed l i t t le  prestige  and were perceived in  te rm s o f the u n fo rtu n a te  label 
o f P res iden t T a f t ’s, ‘ l i t t le  b row n  b ro th e rs ” ® I t  was on ly  w ith  the Presidency o f C arlos 
C a rc ia  (1957-1961) th a t  P h ilip p in e  fore ign po licy  began to  change to  a more independent 
m ode, lo o k in g  to w a rds  A s ia , fo r by th is  tim e  the im p a c t o f the A p r il  1955 Bandung  
Conference had reached fe r t ile  ground. By the end o f the 1950s the G arc ia  
A d m in is tra t io n  realised th a t  the re  was a
g riev io us  m is im press ion  w hich  has gained currency in Asian and European 
circ les th a t  our freedom  n o tw ith s ta n d in g , we rem ain  a v ir tu a l co lony o f the US 
... O u r independence d id  no t gain fo r us the respect we expected from  our fe llow. Q
Asians.
M oreover the  P h ilip p in es  d id  no t pursue the c la im  to  Sabah before 1962 since, a t the  tim e  
the B r it is h  assumed d ire c t a d m in is tra tio n  o f Sabah, the P h ilip p in es  had ju s t gained 
independence. I t  was fe lt by the  early P residents o f the P h ilip p in e s  w ho in  any case were 
preoccupied w ith  o th e r issues, th a t i t  w ou ld  be too  soon fo r a young s ta te  to  ‘ tw is t the 
ta il o f the  B r it is h  l io n ’ ,® o r in  any way s t ir  up an in te rn a tio n a l ‘s to rm ’ . I t  was on ly as the 
idea o f the  Federa tion  o f M a lays ia , in c lu d in g  Sabah, was m ooted and looked lik e ly  to  
succeed th a t  the  P h ilip p in e s  fo rm a lly  asserted its  c la im  by o b jec ting  to  the inco rp o ra tion  
o f w h a t was alleged to  be a p a r t o f the P h ilipp ines.*®
W ith  the  trend  to w a rd  rea lignm en t away fro m  the US and tow ards  Asia , the 
P h ilip p in e s  became m ore ac tive  in reg iona l o rgan isa tions and regional p o litics .
'*Le ife r, T h e  P h ilip p in e  C la im  to  S abah, pp .6-7 .
® Leife r, M ic h a e l, T he  F o re ig n  R e la tio ns  o f the  New S ta tes , (A u s tra lia ,  Lo ng m an , 1974), 
pp. 40-41.
~ L a ird , op. c i t . , p p .32-34. A t  B an du ng  the re  was an u n d e r ly in g  fee ling  am ong key F ilip in o s  
th a t  th e y  were not be ing take n  serious ly  because o f th e ir  A m erican  lin k s  and p ro -W este rn  po lic ies.
8 •I b id . , p .38. Q uo te d  fro m  D e p a rtm e n t o f F o re ig n  A ffa irs  R eview ', O c to b e r 1959, p 52.
® Le ife r,T h e  P h ilip p in e  C la im  to  S abah , p.8.
10 I b id . , p.23.
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Recognition of its Asian identity and destiny brought with it a realization of the 
importance of the environment in which the Philippines was to survive. Starting from the 
change tha t  Garcia had initiated, Macapagal was to try to manipulate tha t  regional 
environment for the good of the Philippines. Regional politics in the specific form of the 
Sabah claim, which had previously been ignored, now became the most important foreign 
policy initiative Macapagal was to undertake. In essence the claim became a reflection of 
Philippine interest in, and proclamation of, its Asian identity.**
Officially the Philippine government expressed another reason to support its claim 
to Sabah other than tha t  of historical right, namely, that the security of the Philippines 
was a t  stake. Although it was unlikely, the government in Manila stated tha t  it feared 
th a t  Sabah’s inclusion in Malaysia would encourage communist penetration of a part of 
Borneo which was considered to be directly linked to the preservation of Philippine
i  o
sovereignty. Macapagal declared tha t  the new state of Malaysia would be incapable of 
preventing a communist takeover of North Borneo and this would in turn facilitate 
communist infiltration into Southern Philippines. Indeed, Sabah was geographically only
i  o
18 miles from the nearest Philippine island, whereas it was 1000 miles from Malaya.10
Much of the energy devoted by Manila to the Sabah claim was the product of one 
man, Diasdado Macapagal.** However, the Sabah claim did not die a natural death with 
the inauguration of a new president in 1965. Nor did the Sabah claim diminish with the 
perceived decline of the communist danger in Malaysia or the acceptance of the 
Philippines as an integral part of Southeast Asia upon its assumption of membership in 
ASEAN.
Macapagal’s successor, Ferdinand Marcos, restored full diplomatic relations with 
Malaysia in 1966, which had been broken off with the formation of the Federation. 
However, Marcos still did not drop the Philippine claim to Sabah. His policy was not to 
actively pursue the claim but at the same time not to jeopardize it. The issue was no
**Laird, op .c it . , pp.8-24. Also see Leifer, Dilemmas of Statehood in Southeast Asia, pp.128-129.
* Leifer, The Philippine Claim to Sabah, p.37.
I 9
°Littaua, Ferdinand,The Philippines and Southeast Asia 1954 -1972: A Study of Philippine
Policies towards Regional Organisations, Thesis, University of Geneva, 1977, pp.52-53.
14Ibid., p.12.
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longer discussed between Malaysia and the Philippines and did not form part of major 
discussions for the formation of ASEAN.* 1'*
However, the Sabah issue was not destined to remain dormant for long. In January 
1968 Marcos visited Malaysia. A joint communique was issued at the end of the visit 
stating that Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Malaysian Prime Minister, and Marcos had 
agreed to hold talks on Sabah at their earliest convenience. Before this could take place, 
on 21 March 1968, Manila newspapers carried reports of a group of Filipino Muslim 
commandos in secret training on Corregidor island. It was presumed tha t  their purpose 
was to infiltrate S a b a h .T h e r e a f t e r ,  relations between the two countries deteriorated 
rapidly. Sabah again entered the Philippine and Malaysian domestic political scenes. 
Malaysia broke diplomatic relations with the Philippines on 19 September 1968. This was 
a direct result of the passing in the Philippine Congress and Marcos’ subsequent decision 
to sign Senate Bill Number 954. This Bill defined Philippine territorial parameters as 
being
without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territoral sea 
around the territory of Sabah situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic
. 1 7of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
At the same time Marcos made clear that there would be no intention to ‘physically’ 
incorporate Sabah into the Philippines. His actions aimed to serve the twin purposes of 
reassuring the Malaysians on the one hand and using the issue to rally nationalist support 
in the coming elections of 1970.
The deterioration of relations between the two countries resulted in the non­
functioning of ASEAN for eight months. However, with the mediation efforts of 
Indonesia and Thailand, and the resumption of diplomatic relations with Malaysia in 
December 1969, Marcos promised not to raise the Sabah issue again within ASEAN 
auspices. Marcos made this promise for the sake of t he survival of ASEAN, believing that
1 llJorgensen-Dahl,  o p .c i t . , p p . 104-107.
1 0
K aul,  op .c i t . , p.95. The  sole survivor of the m u tiny  at the  island told a congressional 
com m ittee  th a t  infiltration had been the purpose of their  train ing. This was denied by the officer- 
in-charge of the camp, s ta t ing  th a t  the purpose of both cam p  and train ing was to com bat possible 
insurgency by com munists .
1 " ib id . , pp .99-100.
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at  the time ASEAN was of paramount importance to developing countries like the
Philippines. In spite of this, the Philippines continued to assert that it was the rightful
1 ftheir to Sabah and th a t  the issue should be settled by the International Court of Justice. 
But finally, at the Second Summit Conference of the ASEAN Heads of State held in 
Kuala Lumpur in August 1977, Marcos announced tha t  the Philippines intended to 
withdraw its claim to Sabah, stating that:
Before ASEAN can look to the outside world for equity, for justice and 
fairness we must establish order, fairness and justice among ourselves. As a 
contribution, therefore, I say in earnest to the future of ASEAN, I wish to 
announce that the government of the Republic of the Philippines is therefore 
taking definite steps to eliminate one of the burdens of ASEAN - the claim of the 
Philippine Republic to Sabah. It is our hope tha t  this will be a permanent 
contribution to the unity, the strength and the prosperity of all of A S E A N .^
The Philippines was then under martial law imposed by Marcos. He therefore, could 
afford to largely ignore domestic nationalist feelings over Sabah. Moreover, it was an 
aspicious moment for Marcos to demonstrate his ‘benevolence’. He was in the Malaysian 
capital and could be seen to be working towards better Malaysian-Philippine relations 
and thereby, working towards better ASEAN solidarity by lifting one of the few
o n
remaining political ‘burdens of ASEAN’. Marcos stated that he did this as a
9 1‘permanent contribution to the unity, the strength and prosperity of all of ASEAN.’
M a la y s ia n  T ies  w i th  F i l ip in o  M u s l im s
The geographical proximity of Sabah and the Southern islands of the Philippines 
has only served to worsen the conflict over Sabah. Not only has this proximity been 
presented as a reason for Manila's claim to Sabah, but the notion tha t  ‘from time 
immemorial the Sulu Archipelago had costituted a single economic and cultural un it’ has
1ft1 The Malaysians did not consider the sovereignty question debatable because they believed that 
UN reports which ascertained that the Sabah people wanted to be a part of Malaysia demonstrated 
the legitamacy of Malaysian sovereignty . To bring the matter to the International Court of Justice 
would be to deal with the issue in a purely legal manner. Malaysians believed the matter could be 
settled by an assertion of self-determination on the part of the Sabahans. See Noble, Lela Garner, 
Philippine Policy toward Sabah: A Claim to Independence, (Arizona, The University of Arizona 
Press, 1977), pp.212-220.
^ Foreign Policy D igest , Perfecto Jr, Isidero T, (ed), (Philippines, Foreign Service Institute,  
1983), p.20.
^ Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 August 1977, pp.20-21.
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enabled Filipino Muslim rebels to find sanctuary, refuge, aid and support in Sabah away 
from the Philippine government. Almost all the Filipino Muslim groups have relatives 
and kinsmen in Sabah. A major Filipino Muslim group in Sulu, the Tausag, are found in 
Sabah; other Filipino Muslim groups, the Maranao-Ilaun and Maguindanao also have
9 o
relations in Sabah.
The Muslim Filipino problem has plagued the Philippine government since
9 A
independence/2 *4 *9 It was one factor used by Marcos in 1972 as justification for the 
imposition of martial law. By the time martial law was lifted on 17 January 1981, the 
Muslim problem had still to be resolved, in spite of actions Marcos took to end the 
Muslim separatist movement and promote factionalism within the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF).26
The first linkage between Malaysian-Philippine relations over the Sabah issue and 
the Muslim separatist movement in the Philippines, occurred six years after the first 
formal assertion by Macapagal for control of Sabah. This was the Corregidor incident 
mentioned above. On 21 March 1968, Manila newspapers reported tha t  there had been a 
mutiny in an army camp on Corregidor island situated at the mouth of Manila Bay. 
These mutineers were later disarmed and killed in what became known in the Muslim 
world as the Mabidah Massacare’.
Corregidor had become the site of a secret project code-named ''Operation 
Merdeka . Operation Merdeka was to have been the infiltration of Sabah by Filipino 
Muslims trained at Corregidor. Supposedly these Muslims mutinied because they refused
2“ Ariff, o p .c i t . , p.35.
2 °  . . . . .  . . .
Gowing, P e te r  G, Muslim Filipinos - Heritage and Horizon, (Quezon City, New Day
Publishers, 1979), p.3.
24 Ib id . , Gowing s ta tes tha t ,  ‘from the Moro s ta ndpo in t ,  it was one th ing  to acquiesce in the  
governm ent of Americans who had defeated them  tim e and again in battle ;  it was ano ther  th ing to
acquiesce in the governm ent of Christ ian  Filipinos who. as soldiers under the  Spaniards, had never 
effectively conquered them after three centuries of t ry in g . ’
9 r
°M ay , R  J, and  Nemenzo, Francisco, (eds), The  Philippines After M arcos , (Sydney, Croom 
Helm L td ,  1985), p . 113.
26 Ib id . , pp. 110-124, May gives a succinct account of M arcos’ actions and his success in dividing 
the  leading Muslim movem ent, the Moro N ational L iberation  F ront.
27 George, T  J S, Revolt in M indanao: The  Rise of Islam in Philippine P o li t ic s , (K uala  Lum pur,  
Oxford University  Press, 1980), pp. 122-123.
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to  fight fellow Muslims. This version was supported  by many opposition politicians. 
However, the official version of the whole affair was th a t  the operation had been one of 
counterinsurgency. The Muslims had been recruited to deal with the guerilla activities of 
com m unist elements from Indonesia. The m utiny  was said to have been sparked by a 
delay in the paym ent of salaries and too rigorous training. However, the whole affair
9 Q
remained suspicious as the very name of the operation means ‘to l ibera te’ in E n g l is h /  
Many other people ap a r t  from Marcos’ opponents believed th a t  the operation was for the
o n
infiltration of Sabah if Sabah could not possibly be obtained through legal settlement.
The Corregidor incident provided one further link between the Sabah issue and the 
Filipino Muslims. Marcos had apparently , in secret, decided to make available the forces 
to  support  a possible insurgency in Sabah, bu t  a t  the same time he tried to improve 
relations with Malaysia. The a t tem p t  to improve relations can be clearly seen in the visit 
by Marcos to M alaysia in January  1968 which resulted in an anti-smuggling pact. 
Marcos, however, had to keep a balance. He was facing elections in 1970 and he intended 
to  win. He could not, therefore, allow even a marginal issue like Sabah to go unheeded. 
Although he could not afford to alienate the Muslims in the south in a contest with 
M alaysia, an Islamic country , he also needed to preserve his co u n try ’s prestige which was 
im p o rtan t  to his electorate, and which would be dam aged by perceived weakness on the
9  1
Sabah issue.' His toughness with the Malaysians immediately after Corregidor m ust be 
seen in this light.
Ultimately, however, Marcos decided th a t  the consequences of pursuing the Sabah 
claim would be of greater detr im ent to the Philippine national image, as this would upset 
relations not only with M alaysia but also with the rest of ASEAN. The Philippines was 
beginning to realise th a t  regional cooperation was im p ortan t ,  if not vital for the coun try ’s 
security and economy. The country had to preserve and s trengthen w hat Southeast Asian 
links it could since:
o o
Indonesia until 1965 was controlled by Sukarno who was under the influence of the pro-Beijing 
Indonesian C om m unis t  P a r ty  (PKI). Their  des truction  by S uhar to  was still being completed in 
1968.
^ N o b l e ,  op .c i t . , p.165.
30Ibid., p.166.
31 Ib id . , p.206.
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The place of the Philippines in Asia was marginal already, certainly to a 
greater degree than tha t  of Malaysia, which had increasing cooperation with
m # *} o
Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and India .0
However, despite Marcos’ a ttem pts  to downgrade the Sabah claim, he did not 
succeed in stopping the consequences of the Corregidor incident. This failure not only 
provided the Filipino Muslims with the impetus for organising to counter what they
9 9
believed to be a genocidal campaign against them ,00 but it made
all sections of Muslims - secular and religious, modern and backward alike -
O  A
concerned about their fu ture . 4
Worse still Corregidor led to an escalation of Muslim resistence in Southern Philippines 
which received external aid channelled through Sabah.
M a la y s ia n  S u p p o r t  fo r  F i l ip in o  M u s l im s
Sabah’s then Chief Minister, Tun M ustapha bin Datu Harun, reacted angrily to the
*> r
Corregidor incident .0 M ustapha probably decided to aid the Filipino Muslims for two 
reasons. First, he was a Tausag from Sulu and most of the dead in the Jabidah massacare, 
after the Corregidor mutiny, were Suluanos. M ustapha’s clan was not only extensive in 
the Sulu islands but scores of his relatives were also engaged in the insurgency in one way 
or another; his own kith and kin were involved. Moreover, as a Muslim himself, the plight 
of Muslims so close to his doorstep would have been in any case a m atter of concern to 
him .'*6
Secondly, it is possible th a t  M ustapha had bigger plans for Sabah. Federal leaders 
in Kuala Lumpur believed tha t  M ustapha’s aims were to enlarge the political entity that 
was Sabah to include the whole of the Sulu Archipelago, in effect restoring the Sulu 
Sultanate. Their suspicions were fuelled by M ustapha’s background and character. His 
autocratic, ruthless personality made it difficult for Kuala Lumpur to deal both with him
32Ibid., p.219.
°°G ow ing, op.c it. , pp.193-194.
'^George, op .c it . , pp.125-126.
' Noble, op.c it. , p.170. He charged that Marcos had double-crossed Malaysia by not dropping 
the Sabah claim in exchange for Malaysian help in ending smuggling between the border of the two 
countries. Leifer, in Dilemmas of Statehood in Southeast Asia, also refers to this.
° 6George, op.c it. , p.234.
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9 7
and the possibility t h a t  he would force the separation of Sabah from Malaysia. ' It was 
for this reason th a t  Malaysian leaders in Kuala Lum pur a t tem p ted  to  remove him from
9 0
the Sabah political scene by offering him a cabinet post in the Federal governm ent.0 
However, M ustapha  was to refuse this offer, seeing through the political ploy to remove 
him from power in Sabah. He was eventually forced to retire on 31 October 1975, and 
soon lost his pivotal position of power in Sabah when he lost the December 1976 elections 
there. W ith M u s ta p h a ’s defeat, the new Chief Minister, D atuk Harris Salleh, assured 
M arcos th a t  Sabah would no longer aid the Filipino Muslims. Marcos was willing to 
accept this undertaking. At the very least, Marcos was sure th a t  any further aid would 
not be given in the open fashion and in the large quantities  th a t  was prevalent during
OQ
M u sta p h a ’s time.
From  the perspective of the Filipino Muslims too, Sabah was the most natura l  
refuge and source of support.  Not only was M u s tap h a  willing to assist them  but Sabah, 
because of its geographical proximity and cultural closeness to the Filipino Muslims, 
provided the most na tu ra l  base for their o p e ra t io n s .^  However, Sabah was not alone in 
its provision of support  for the Muslim Filipino rebels. The Malaysian government itself 
was also reported to  be involved.^^ Pulau Pangkor, a Malaysian island north of Kuala
A t )
Lum pur, was said to  have been set up as a train ing base for Filipino Muslims.
Reports of M alaysia’s active support for the Filipino Muslim rebels, particularly 
from Sabah under M ustapha ,  have been difficult to prove. Official Malaysian policy has
° " lb id . , pp.236- 238. It was a belief accepted by large num bers  of people, backed by personal 
tes t im ony  of a former blood brother  of M ustapha  , Tun  M oham m ad  F aud .
9 0
F a r  Eastern  Economic Review , 8 August 1975, p.14. M alaysian P rim e Minister T un  Abdul 
Razak was so keen to have M ustapha  removed from power in Sabah th a t  he went out of his way to 
make M u s ta p h a  third in the  seniority list in the Federal Cabinet.
° ^ Fa.r Eastern Economic Review, 16 September 1977, p .30.
^ G e o r g e ,  op .c i t . , p.235.
^  Noble, op .c i t . , pp.207- 208.
^ T he  Bulle t in , 25 May 1974. Nur Misuari, leader of the M N LF, was supposed to have been 
tra ined  there. M anila apparen tly  showed a dossier to the Saudi Foreign Minister in April 1974 
conta in ing  evidence th a t  M alaysians had trained several hundred Filipino guerillas for the ‘Peop le’s 
A rm y ’ of the ‘Moro National Liberation F r o n t ’. It showed also th a t  the M N LF had landed 58 
parties in the Philippines after Malaysian arm y officers had instructed  them  in jungle warfare, 
sabo tage  and intelligence, and to have supplied the insurgents with 200,000 rounds of am m unition ,  
more th a n  5000 au tom atic  weapons, mines and grenades since December 1972. See also F ar  Eastern  
Economic Review, 3 June  1974, p. 15.
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been to deny any such support. It is probable tha t  Malaysia did provide sanctuary and a 
measure of aid to Muslim Filipinos. This action was probably intended to achieve 
Philippine renunciation of its claim to Sabah. The level of aid was probably not high, 
especially in later years when Malaysia felt th a t  the claim had already come to a de facto
A O
ending. Moreover, Malaysia places a higher priority on the internal stability of ASEAN. °  
Since Sabahans have chosen to remain in Malaysia, the legitimacy of self-determination 
would act to defeat any present legal basis for the Philippine claim to Sabah. Malaysia 
has also acted to minimise any external inteference in the m atter from interested parties 
such as the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) by stating clearly th a t  the ‘problem 
was being handled by the ASEAN’.'*4 To this end, Malaysia has the support of Indonesia, 
especially in light of Indonesia’s past problems with regional Islamic rebellions. It is also 
not in Malaysia’s interest to promote excitement over the plight of the Southern 
Philippine Muslims, since this would only serve to provide an additional reason for 
domestic agitation on the part of the fundamentalist Islamic opposition in the Partai 
Islam (PAS). For this reason, any action by the Malaysians to aid the Muslim Filipinos 
since the mid-1970s has been covert and low level. It has been used as a type of 
‘bargaining chip’ to ensure that Marcos would back his promise in 1977 to eliminate the 
claim and take concrete steps such as changing the Philippine constitution to remove all 
indirect references to Sabah as part of the Philippines.
For his pari., Marcos also downplayed the Philippine claim to Sabah after the 
Corregidor incident. He realised ASEAN’s priorities of stability in the region and 
economic development. Moreover, the US was sympathetic to the Malaysian position over 
Sabah.4l) However, Marcos probably still retained a residual Philippine claim to Sabah in 
order either to force the Malaysians to pledge complete non-interference in the Southern 
Philippines or to ensure that no future Malaysian leader would increase aid to the 
Filipino Muslims. Although the Moro problem diminished in intensity to the extent that 
it constituted only an irritant during the last years of Marcos' rule, the potential
^ ' ’Bulletin  T o d a y , 25 O ctober  1985.
44 F a r  E astern  Economic R eview , 24 June 1974. p.18.
45 Kaul,  op .c i t . , p.102.
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remained tha t  Filipino Muslims could again resort to arms to physically obtain what they 
believed to be their due.4(’
M a r co s  or A q u in o ?
Residual conflict between the two countries did exist to the extent that Marcos 
never formally declared tha t  Sabah belonged to Malaysia even after he verbally assured 
Malaysian leaders in 1977 that the Philippines would drop the claim. ' The Malaysians 
w'anted a constitutional amendment to this effect. Marcos had said in 1977 that there 
were legal, political, and psychological obstacles which prevented a quick renunciation.
iO
His main critics were the ‘old society’ politicians led by former President Macapagal. 
The Malaysian leaders’ scepticism was proved correct when no further action was taken 
to amend the constitution. They believed tha t  Marcos’ pronouncements renouncing 
Sabah were superficial considering that Sabah was still indirectly declared as 
constitutionally a part of the Philippines. The 1973 constitution of the Philippines defines 
the national territory in such a way tha t  it implys tha t  Sabah belongs to the Philippines 
by ‘historic right or legal t it le ’.49 In short Marcos failed to convince Malaysian leaders of 
his sincerity to solve the Sabah issue.
A reflection of this failure is the fact that the Malaysian Prime Minister has not 
visited the Philippines since the making of the Sabah claim. Moreover, in 1981 the Sabah 
issue flared up once again when the Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir bin Mohammad, 
made it pointedly clear tha t  he would not visit the Philippines until the Philippines 
formally dropped its claim to S a b a h . I n  apparent retaliation against M ahathir’s 
s ta tem ent, then Philippines Defence Minister Juan Ponce Enrile alleged that some 
Filipino rebels had set up a training camp in Sabah. There was also a further move in the 
Philippine National Assembly to revive the Sabah claim. Malaysian officials denied that
4^Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 August 1984, p.30. For many Muslim Filipinos, to be 
without a gun is to be naked. In all cases of MNLF surrenders the Filipino Muslims are allowed to 
keep their weapons.
4 ~Agence France Press, 13 October 1985.
4^Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 August 1977, pp.20-21
4 '^ Business D a y , 6 June 1986.
50 Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 December 1981, p.10.
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Malaysia would allow any individuals or groups to use its territory to carry out 
clandestine activities against it or any other country. The Sabah Chief Minister at the 
time, Harris Salleh, then called on the Malaysian government to sever diplomatic ties 
with the Philippines if they did not drop the Sabah claim and ‘continued ‘to harass’ the 
state  with allegations of ha.bouring Muslim and any other anti-Marcos rebels in its 
t e r r i t o r y . B o t h  Marcos and Mahathir moved to dispel the tension between the two 
countries, Marcos denying that Enrile’s allegations were the view of the Philippine 
government and Mahathir emphasising that there should not be a rupture of diplomatic 
ties in light of Marcos’ 1977 declaration. The Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister at the 
time, Musa Hitam, also stressed the importance of ASEAN as well as his faith that all 
problems could be solved within ASEAN auspices.
On 23 September 1985, pirates identified as Filipinos, attacked the town of Lahad 
Datu on the east coast of Sabah. This attack pointedly illustrated the continuing lack of 
cooperation between Malaysia and the Philippines in border patrols, despite the 
membership of both countries for more than ten years in ASEAN. A further report of an 
apparan t retaliatory attack by Malaysian soldiers on the Philippine island of Maranas 
close to the Philippine-Malaysian border, illustrated the continued conflict between the 
two countries over the unresolved Philippine claim to Sabah during the Marcos era. In an 
a ttem pt to dissipate tensions between the two countries, both concluded that the 
Maranas raid was an attem pt to create dissension within ASEAN on the eve of a UN
r o
debate on Kampuchea.
It was obvious to the Malaysians, especially after 1977, that they could not trust 
Marcos. Since he first came to power in 1965 until the time he was forced out in 
February 1986, Marcos had not formally renounced the Philippine claim to Sabah despite 
his promises firstly, to settle the issue peacefully in the 1960s, and secondly, to renounce 
the claim in the 1970s. Moreover, the issue was again brought up by the Philippines in 
1981. This was at the expense of much needed cooperation between the two countries to
^ M alaysian  D iges t, 31 December 1981, p.3. 
Asiaweek, 18 O ctober  1985, p.10.
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end piracy and smuggling a t  their borders. The pira te  a ttack  a t Lahad D a tu  provided one 
more example th a t  pointed to M arcos’ lack of com m itm ent to resolve the issue once and 
for all, and thereby re s ta r t  border patrol cooperation with Malaysia.
It was, moreover, not only M arcos’ diffidence and broken promises over Sabah th a t  
upset the  Malaysians. The tables had turned. The com m unist victory th a t  Macapagal 
had feared would happen in M alaysia in the 1960s did not take place. In fact the recent 
surrender in March 1987 of eighty-nine com m unist insurgents from the E ighth  Regiment 
of the C om m unist  P a r ty  of M alaya (C PM ), one of its s trongest sections, has been
r  9
regarded as possibly the beginning of the end for the forty year m ovem ent.00 In contrast,  
the  Philippines now faces a major th rea t  from the Com m unist P arty  of the  Philippines 
(C P P )  and its military arm , the New People’s Army (N P A ).°4 M ah a th ir  was clearly 
concerned abou t this as well as M arcos’ lack of public support. He was reported to have 
said a t  the Com monw ealth Sum m it in the Baham as,
We would expect the Philippine government would learn from its neighbours 
t h a t  the best way to handle the situation would be to  come to te rm s with the 
wishes of the people. If the m ajority  of the population is behind the government 
and believes in the fight against terrorism, there is no problem .00
In light of this s ta tem en t from M aha th ir  and the  massive growth of the communist 
problem in the Philippines, M aha th ir  had come to the conclusion th a t  Marcos had little 
support .
It was not only the spread of communism in itself th a t  worried the Malaysians. 
They were also worried about the US bases in the Philippines, should Marcos lose control 
and the com m unists  take over. Although a t  present Malaysia does not face an immediate 
external th rea t ,  much of Malaysian defence policy relies on its Western allies, first of the 
British until its w ithdraw al East of Suez in 1959, then on the Five Power Defence 
A rrangem en t (FPD A ) with Australia, New Zealand, Britain and Singapore, as well as on 
a continued American presence in the region. T he most serious long-term threa t  the
° ° Sydney Morning H erald , 17 March 1987.
c 4
' F a r  E astern  Economic Review , 5 July 1984, p. 12. 
55 Business D a y , 25 October 1985.
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Malaysians perceive is the possibility of Chinese expansionism in Southeast Asia.'^ 
Indeed within ASEAN, Malaysia’s attitude toward Vietnam has been sympathetic. After 
the Vietnamese Occupation of Kampuchea in 1978-79, ASEAN embarked on a project to 
drum  up international condemnation of the invasion, but it was ‘notably the Malaysian 
government that remained responsive to Soviet overtures for amelioration in ASEAN
r n
attitudes towards Hanoi. Malaysian perceptions of a threat from China has led to its 
hopes of Vietnam as an ally. At the same time, although Malaysia does not fear Vietnam, 
its real worry would be the Soviet Union’s support of Vietnam, Soviet extension of its 
forces into the region and increasing Soviet activity in the region. To counter this, 
Malaysia strongly supports the continued US presence in the region through its bases in
r o
the Philippines, as for all accounts, the FPDA ‘falls well short of a ‘real’ alliance.’0
Lack of access to official da ta  has made it close to impossible to provide conclusive 
analysis of the Malaysian reaction to the strong challenge Corazon Aquino provided to 
Marcos in the 7 February 1986 presidential elections. As will be seen below, most of the 
da ta  collected from public sources points to possibly more Malaysian support for Aquino 
than from the rest of ASEAN. Much of this had to do with Malaysian experiences with 
Marcos as outlined above. However, Malaysia's favourable reaction to Aquino was also a 
product of their perceptions of Aquino herself.
On the issue of insurgency, which had Malaysia and most of ASEAN worried, 
Aquino had little experience.0'^  However, she had the popular support tha t  Mahathir 
described as fundamental to the fight against communism. Even with an election 
‘wracked by fraud, violence and voter-list manipulation’, Aquino was able to garner more 
than 46% of the v o te .^  Moreover, in spite of Marcos’ experience with the communists,
° ^ F a r  Eastern  Economic R eview , 20 October 1983, p.48.
' '"v an  der Kroef, Ju s tu s  M, ‘A SEA N  in the 1980s’, W orld Review , Vol.19, N o.3, August 1980, 
p.61. van der Kroef goes on to report th a t  a few days after M alaysian Foreign Minister 
R i th a u d d e e n ’s visit to Hanoi, ‘R ithauddeen  declared th a t  ASEAN in fact should accept Vietnamese 
assurances th a t  the SRV (Socialist Republic of V ietnam ) had no terr itor ia l am bitions on Thai land  
or o ther  members of the association . . . ’
° ^ F ar  Eastern  Economic R eview , 20 October 1983, pp .49-51.
5 9
F a r  Eastern  Economic R ev iew , 19 December 1985, p.44.
60 F a r  Eastern  Economic R eview , 27 F ebruary  1986, p.10.
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L* 1
their num bers  had actually  increased during the years of his rule.
Both in te rm s  of style and experience, Aquino could more or less be seen as an 
opposite to Marcos. Indeed her presidential campaign platform emphasized this. Her late 
husband, Senato r Benigno Aquino, was perhaps Marcos’ s trongest political opponent. 
Reports  from the  press describe Aquino as ‘constantly  referring in her im prom tu speeches 
to  asking for guidance from ... the example of her dead husband (‘w hat would ‘Ninoy’ 
have done?’) .’^  She had also been in the best position, and used th a t  position, to advise 
her husband  occasionally as he climbed the political ladder. Her years with Benigno 
Aquino would have provided for the absorption of his political id e a s .^  When Senator 
Aquino was in jail during m artia l law, Cory Aquino became his ‘eyes, ears and voice ... 
ac ting  as his liason with w h a t  remained of the Philippine o p p o s i t io n .^ 4 This went on for 
more th an  seven years and she received valuable tuition from her husband on opposition 
strategies. It is possible therefore th a t  the prime factor th a t  would have placed the 
M alaysians on A quino’s side would have been the anticipation th a t  she would reflect the 
political views th a t  her husband the late Senator had held. P rim ary  to the issue would be 
his views on Sabah. In the early 1970s in reference to to Sabah, he sta ted  that:
I believe all this fuss, all this excitement is nothing more than an exercise in 
futility and we are being brainwashed to  wage a campaign of hate  and possibly 
w ar over a terr itory  we surely will never w ant to get - if we abide by our holy 
pream bles and prime principles as a people.^'*
M arcos’ past  record proved th a t  the Malaysians really had little to lose from 
A quino’s ascension to power in the Philippines. In fact they had everything to  gain. 
Aquino had come to power ‘free of plans and programmes, free of restricting ideologies . . .’ 
and she could ‘join the growing ranks of A sia’s pragm atic  leaders, dealing with problems 
on their m e r i t s . S h e  was also seen as a conservative leader who was not anti-American. 
Her cam paign  platform  endorsed the US bases agreem ent reached during M arcos’ term  of
^ F a r  E astern  Economic Rev iew . 21 November 1985, p p .52-57. 
62 F a r  E astern  Economic R ev iew , 19 December 1985, p.40. 
6:>,Ib id . , p.41.
^4T im e , 5 J a n u a ry  1987, p . l l .
^"’Q uoted  in Kaul, op .c i t . , p.77.
66 F a r  E astern  Economic R ev iew . 6 March 1986, p.15.
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office. She agreed tha t  the bases should remain at least until 1991.^  Thus there was 
every indication tha t  the Sabah problem would be more easily resolved with Aquino than 
with Marcos had he remained in power. This proved to be correct as a month after 
Marcos had left, Foreign Minister Salvador Laurel’s first foreign policy speech to the 
Philippine Council of Foreign Relations, stated tha t  the Sabah issue ‘for too long has ... 
been allowed to fester and adversely affect relations’ between the two countries. He also 
stated his desire to resolve the Sabah issue thus strengthening ASEAN. He added that 
Manila would only seek a reassurance from Malaysia that Sabah would not be allowed to 
become a source of threat to the Philippines in exchange for dropping the claim . ^
T h e  P h i l ip p in e s  U n d e r  A q u in o
However, in spite of this initial s tart  towards ending the Sabah dispute, the issue
has yet to be resolved according to Filipino and Malaysian expectations. Aquino decided
to draw up a new Philippine constitution and the Malaysians quickly let it be known that
the Philippines should renounce Sabah through a change in the constitution concerning
Philippine national territory, rather than by presidential declaration. Specifically, Kuala
Lumpur proposed tha t  the claim be renounced by way of a provision in the constitution
7D"defining the exact boundaries of the Philippines.
Although many members of the Constitutional Commission drafting the new 
constitution of the Philippines were in favour of totally dropping the claim to Sabah, it 
was an emotional issue to modify the definition of national territory, as this was defined
. 7 1as ‘including territories belonging to the Philippines by historic right or legal t it le’. 
Changes in this definition could also have repercussions on other disputed territorial 
claims of the Philippines, like the Kalayaan islands in the South China Sea. Opposition 
leader Bias Ople, a member of the Constitutional Commission, had also stated tha t ,  ‘it, 
will be sufficient to show that at the time of the writing of the new Constitution, the
Asiaweek, 9 February  1986, p.22.
^ F a r  Eastern  Economic R eview , 24 April 1986, p.42.
’' I^n te rna t ional  Herald T r ib u n e , 14 April 1986.
70 Agence France P ress , 19 May 1986.
71 S tra its  T im e s , 10 Ju n e  1986.
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framers had recorded their intent to exclude (Sabah) from the purview of the territorial
7 0
provision.’
Therefore, there was a growing consensus in the Constitutional Commission that 
the claim over Sabah should be dropped and no reference be made about it in the new
7 0
constitution. To this end the new constitution defines Philippine national territory as 
comprising
the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and water embraced therein, 
and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty of 
jurisdiction
Although the phrase ‘historic right or legal t it le ’ was deleted from the Constitution, the 
new definition is said to be
broad enough to allow the authorities to pursue the Sabah claim, should they 
decide to do so, on the basis of having sovereignty or jurisdiction. At the same 
time, it does not provoke neighbouring states that may feel referred to by the 
phrase ‘historic right or legal t it le ’.
Clearly some sensitivity still surrounds the Philippines claim to Sabah, as was evident in 
the Constitutional Commission’s refusal to state directly and clearly that the Philippines 
renounced Sabah as part of its territory. Concomitant with this is the statement over 
Sabah made by Enrile, at present the major opposition figure. Enrile has said that the 
Constitutional Commission did give away Sabah and that it ‘made a big mistake. It 
abandoned a long-standing claim and lost priceless resources that foreigners will now be 
able to e x p l o i t . H o w e v e r ,  such statements by opposition political figures in the 
Philippines can be seen as a ttem pts  by them to embarrass the government.
Senator Aquino also played more than an active part in the Muslim Filipino 
problem. Notably it was the Senator who had gone on a fact-finding tour of Sulu after 
the Jabidah Massacre. He witnessed the intense personal tragedy that scores of families 
had experienced. In 1980-81 he attempted to solve that problem on the basis of the 1976
72IbKb
7,,Reuter, 5 June 1986.
744 1986 Constit ution of the Philippines, p.2.
75 Romero, Flerida Ruth, and Regaldo, Florenz D, Understanding the Constitution. 
7^Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 January 1987, p.21.
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Tripoli A greem ent on which Marcos had reneged. He m et several times with the head of
. . 7 7
the  M N LF, N ur M isuari. ' A lthough th a t  a t te m p t  failed, Cory Aquino subsequently 
found she received Muslim support ,  albeit only because the Muslim rebel groups were 
strongly an ti-M arcos. They were eager to establish channels of communication and 
cooperation with th e  opposition to  hasten the downfall of Marcos. 0 Aquino promised in 
her election cam paign  to assist Muslims ‘to develop as autonomously as possible ... not, 
however, a p a r t  from the  republic .1 ^ She had largely carried this out when the 
C onsti tu t iona l  Commission recommended constitu tional provision for autonomy in 
M indanao . M alaysia  being an Islamic country could not fail to approve of such a t tem pts  
to solve the M uslim  problem in Southern Philippines. Ju s t  as the Malaysians perhaps 
approved of the Senator,  so too his wife, would be perceived in the same light.
C o n c lu sio n
This C h ap te r  has indicated th a t  M arcos1 insincerity and his inability to gather 
popular  support  behind him to coun ter  the com m unist insurgency, would have placed 
Aquino in a  favourable light with the Malaysians. Some evidence of this can perhaps be 
seen in an editorial in the  pro-governm ent newspaper, The New S traits  Tim es, on 24 
February  1986 before Marcos fell from power. The editorial s ta ted  th a t  Aquino had 
emerged as ‘a highly credible leader1 and was a t t ra c t in g  ‘crowds to her public rallies1. 
Despite her naivety in dealing with the communists, she was seen as a moderate leader, 
certainly non-com m unist and with s trong popular support. All these factors lined up 
against  M alaysia 's  previous experience with Marcos over m atte rs  th a t  most directly affect 
the two countries. Of the three ASEAN countries dealt  with in this thesis, it is perhaps 
the M alaysians who have had the m ost to gain from a change in the Philippine leadership. 
However, it would seem th a t  the two issues th a t  were an i r r i tan t  in bilateral relations, 
remain sensitive issues to  the Filipino people and the new Philippine leader has respected 
this.
"".May and Nemenzo (eds), op.cit. , p.120.
78 May, R, The Philippines Under Aquino: A Perspective from Mindanao, p.7.
79 Ibid., p. 12.
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C h a p t e r  T w o
I n d o n e s ia n - P h i l ip p in e  R e la t io n s
Introduction
Indonesian foreign policy has been conditioned by its past political experience. Its 
relations with the Philippines have been affected by the major differences between the 
political histories of the two countries. A m ajor component of the Indonesian elite are the 
Javanese with their history of empire, especially M ajapah it,  and a pride in their culture 
and civilisation. T he Filipinos, however, had little or no ‘shared culture, political 
s truc tu re  or nob ility ’, which could unite them  into a cohesive socio-political en t i ty .1 2With 
the exception of the Filipino Muslims, they were easily colonized first by the Spaniards, 
and then the Americans. In the process Filipinos to a considerable extent adopted 
Western cultural and political values. Significant differences exist in the ways in which 
the Philippines and Indonesia became independent. The Philippines was the first country 
in Southeast Asia to a t ta in  independence. This was freely given in July 1946. Indonesia, 
however, had a long and difficult struggle against the Dutch before independence was 
granted. It had declared itself independent on 17 August 1945 bu t international 
recognition of its independence was not won until 1949 because of a t tem p ts  by t he Dutch
o
to  retain colonial c o n t r o l /  These differences in their respective records of colonial history 
served to shape both Indonesian and Philippine foreign policy, as well as their perceptions 
and a t t i tu d es  tow ards one another. This especially aggravated  relations between the two 
countries in the early years of their independence. Although a t  present relations between 
the two countries can be described as cordial, the Philippines and Indonesia have never 
had very close relations with each other.
1 Laird, op. cit,., p.2.
2
“Leifer, The  Foreign Relations of the New S ta te s , pp.5-16.
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The Indonesian archipelago stretches across Southeast Asia. It is the largest state 
in the region in terms of both size and population. If for no other reason than this, every 
major political event in Southeast Asia must, a t some point, be assessed in the light of 
the  actual or potential Indonesian reaction to it. In the case of the Philippine political 
crisis, arising from the February 1986 snap presidential elections, Indonesia appears to 
have had several concerns. First, there was the question of geographical proximity to the 
Philippines as the southern tip of the Philippine islands is close to the eastern edge of the 
islands of Indonesia. This proximity has given rise in the past to charges of Philippine 
aid to insurgent Indonesian movements against the Indonesian government. The 
proximity to each other has also given rise to anxiety on the part of the Filipinos. This is 
due to the Muslim rebels in the south of the Philippines. The fear is that these rebels 
might receive aid at some time from the Indonesians who are a predominantly Islamic
o
people.0 The second Indonesian concern stemmed from apparent similarities between the 
political and economic situations of the two island groups of Southeast Asia. The 
possibility of a ‘ripple effect’ spreading from the Philippine political crisis to the domestic 
political situation in Indonesia would concern the Indonesian political elite. Third, any 
instability in a member country of ASEAN, of which Indonesia is the pre-eminent 
member, w'ould affect the stability of ASEAN itself to the discomfort of Indonesia. This 
th rea t  became more pertinant with the dangerously high level of communist insurgency in 
the Philippines. Fourth and last, Indonesia had reason to fear tha t  instability in the 
Philippines could lead to a change in the regional balance of power, since two of the 
largest overseas US military bases are located in the Philippines. Had the political crisis 
in the Philippines led to a closure of the two bases, the US presence in the region would 
have diminished at a time when Chinese and Soviet presence was increasing in Southeast 
Asia.
This chapter intends to examine the concerns of Indonesia with the Philippine
O
° S ur ya d i na ta ,  Leo, ‘Indones ia ’ in Mauzy,  Diane,  K (ed), Politics in the ASEAN Sta tes , 
(Malaysia ,  Marican  & Sons, 1986), p . l l l .  Al though 90% of Indonesians are Musl ims 60% are not 
s t r ic t  Musl ims.  They  are divided into the abangan or nominal  Musl ims and the santri  or rigid 
Musl ims.  Most of the Indonesian elite are Javanese  and it is the Javanese  t h a t  are mainly nominal  
Mus l ims  and the o the r  ethnic groups living in the Oute r  Islands of Indonesia that  are the rigid 
Musl ims.
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political crisis in the light of the four issues above, and also provide an analysis of the 
Indonesian reaction to the demise of one of the longest serving leaders in a Southeast 
Asian country and the rise of a new leader, in a region that has seen little political change 
since the formation of ASEAN.
T h e  Q u e s t io n  o f  G e o g ra p h ic a l  P r o x im i ty
The vastly different political histories of the Philippines and Indonesia, which in the 
early years of independence formed the basis of each country’s foreign policy orientations, 
made geographical proximity an irritant in bilateral relations. Since the late 1950s, 
Indonesia’s foreign policy under President Sukarno, although professing an ‘independent 
and active’ nonalignment in fact leaned towards the foreign policy orientations of the 
Eastern bloc and especially towards China after 1963. The growing communist influence 
over Sukarno exercised by the China-linked Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), together 
with the increasing centralism of the Indonesian government sparked off revolts in the 
Outer Islands of the archipelago.^ This revolt was successfully put down after only a few 
months in mid-1958. However, the rebels had the support and sympathy of the West, 
especially the US. At that time Philippine foreign policy was strongly pro-Western and 
anti-communist in character. Although the Philippines professed neutrality, they were 
sympathetic to the rebels and permitted Indonesian rebels access to Philippine territory.5
In the early 1960s it was the Filipinos who became concerned over their 
geographical proximity to Indonesia. There had been a rapprochement between the two 
countries after the 1958 rebellion in Indonesia. However this easing of tension had been 
due primarily to the common goal of both to stop the formation of the Federation of 
Malaysia. The rapprochement was in reality superficial, as evidenced by the subsequent 
cooling of relations w'hich occured as Indonesia adopted a confrontationist policy towards 
Malaysia. Not only was the Indonesian confrontation anathema to the Philippine belief in 
peaceful negotiations as the basis for the settlement of foreign policy disputes, Manila was
* Ibid., p.74.
' Kaul, op .cit. , pp.113-116. Indonesia suspected that the Philippines and the US were aiding the 
rebels through material support and the provision of facilities, for example, allowing the rebel air 
force to make use of the US Clark Air Force Base.
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also concerned th a t  the dynam ism  of the Indonesian approach would appeal to Filipino 
Muslims. They were concerned th a t  such an a t tra c t io n  m ight lead to Filipino Muslims 
requesting  aid from Indonesia. After all the geographical proximity of Indonesia gave it 
the opp o r tu n ity  to do so m ost effectively.^
W ith  the coming of Suharto, a more m oderate new leader who downplayed 
S u k arn o ’s confron ta tion is t  style of foreign policy, and the en trance of both countries into 
ASEA N , conflict between the two dissipated. Nevertheless, a precedent had been set. 
G eographical proxim ity has remained a factor of concern in such circumstances as the 
Philippine political crisis of the mid-1980s. Domestic instability in the Philippines could 
have a spill-over effect on a close neighbour such as Indonesia, beset by similar internal 
problems.
Sim ilarities  and the Spill-Over Effect
On the surface, a t  the  time of the political crisis in Manila, Indonesia and the 
Philippines appeared to be in a similar political, social and economic situation. The 
Indonesian political system  was highly au th o r i ta r ian  under the dom ination of Suharto. 
A lthough after independence the Philippines was regarded as the only true democracy in 
the region, Marcos had controlled the country  under martial law from 1972 to 1981. With 
the lifting of m artial law in 1981, Marcos nevertheless secured for himself far-reaching 
executive powers. Under Marcos the country was subject to  s tric t au thorita r ian  control. 
Both S u h ar to  and Marcos had been in power for close to twenty years. As each continued 
to  consolidate his power, however, the problem of succession remained. Although this 
problem was solved in the Philippines with the downfall of Marcos, the question of who 
will succeed Suharto  is still unanswered. As Crouch has stated
J a k a r t a  politics are being increasingly played out under the shadow of the 
inevitable departu re  of President Suharto  from the scene."
This creates an increasingly unstable s i tuation  in Indonesia, and it was inevitable th a t  at 
the t im e of the crisis in Manila, J a k a r ta  would have monitered developments with 
concern.
6 • •Leifer, D ilem m as of S ta tehood  in Southeast A sia , p.36. 
^T he  A ge, 10 September 1986.
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Both countries  have had economic difficulties, though for different reasons:
Q
Indonesia because of the world economic recession and the drop in oil prices ; and the 
Philipp ines because of M arcos’ disastrous economic policies.^ Control of the two 
co u n tr ie s ’ island groups was a  problem for both Suharto  and Marcos. Rebel nationalist 
m ovem ents  still op e ra te  aga inst  the Indonesian government in East Timor and Irian Jaya. 
M arcos continued to  have problems with the M NLF and the growing s trength  of the 
com m unis ts  during th e  period of his rule in the P h il ip p in e s .^
Although there  were fundam ental  differences between the two countries which made 
it unlikely th a t  the events  in M anila  could occur in Indonesia, the crisis presented long­
tim e leader S uharto  w ith  serious concern. Major differences between the two countries 
lay in the  am oun t of control Suharto  had in Indonesia as compared with Marcos. The 
Indonesian army had much wider control over the country than the Philippine army ever 
did in the Philippines. T he Indonesian army performs a major functional role in 
governm ent and perm eates  all sectors of government. In the Philippines the army is only 
one a rm  of a  civilian government.
T he  economic histories of the tw o countries were also different. Suharto  had rescued 
Indonesia from the  d isas trous  economic policies of his predecessor, Sukarno . 11 In spite of 
the economic do ldrum s in which the  Indonesians found themselves, Indonesia under
1 9S u h ar to  had a hard-w on, well-earned reputa tion  among Western financial circles. 
M arcos on the o ther  hand had presided over a dam aging economic decline in a nation
1 9
which had, tw enty  years ago, been considered a ‘Southeast Asian pacesetter’. °  His
8 F a r  E astern  Econom ic R ev iew , 23 April 1987, p.74.
^T h e  Asian Wall S treet J o u r n a l , 16 F eb ruary  1986. See also F ar  Eastern Economic Review, 23 
J a n u a r y  1986, p.56.
^ F a r  Eastern  Econom ic R eview , 21 N ovem ber 1985, pp.52- 62.
^ C r o u c h ,  Harold, T he  A rm y and Politics in Indonesia , (London, Cornell University  Press, 
1978), p p .95-96. S u k a rn o ’s political moves had s topped the  entry  of W estern aid. The  economy was 
in a decline by the early 1960s.
i  o
Asiaweek, 4 M ay 1986, p p .30-32. ‘T he  IM F  people in W ash ing ton  give Indonesians top  marks 
for economic m anagem ent .  Bankers in New' York give them  good credit ratings. They d id n ’t frit ter 
away the ir  petrodollars ,  d id n ’t go over the ir  heads in debt,  d id n ’t neglect rura l deve lopm ent.’ 
Besides which the Indonesians have a com fortab le  cushion of $12 billion in foreign reserves. The 
s i tua t ion  is a vastly b r igh te r  economy than  in 1965.
1,,rr i ie  Asian Wall S treet Jo u r n a l , 16 F eb ruary  1986.
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practice of ‘cronyism’ had led amongst other things, to coconut and sugar monopolies and 
an increasing foreign debt such that in 1986 the Philippines was saddled with more than 
$25 billion in foreign debt.* “*
These differences between the two countries remain sufficient to ensure that Suharto 
and the military will not be put in the same situation as Marcos. However, Suharto and 
the military have always been concerned over such dynamic movements as the 
phenomenon of ‘people power’ which occured in the Philippines after the February 
presidential elections. At the same time, surface similarities between the two countries 
would have given the February crisis in the Philippines some impact on the Indonesian 
leadership. The Indonesians would certainly have paid close attention to events in 
Manila, especially since similar though more violent mass movements by students in 
Thailand in 1973 led to the fall of the Thai military-led government and had 
repurcussions on the situation in Indonesia at the t im e.^ ’ Further, the riots that occurred 
in Bandung in 1973 and Jakarta  in 1974, had been the direct result of ‘growing public 
dissatisfaction with corruption, foreign domination of the economy, and the failure of 
economic development to improve the lot of the mass of the people’. ^  Suharto’s anxiety 
would have increased had he known that  the downfall of Marcos would later boost 
opposition movements in other authoritarian-style leaderships across Asia, for example, in 
South Korea, in Bangladesh, and in Pakistan - where Benazir Bhutto is compared with 
Corazon Aquino and Marcos with Zia. Reflective of Suharto’s worry over the internal 
impact of the Philippine crisis on Indonesia was the Indonesian army’s Chief-of-Staff, 
General Benny Murdani’s confirmation in an interview with Asiaweek, in 1985, that the 
biggest threat to Indonesia at present was internal in nature .10
H 1bid.
^ C r o u c h ,  o p .c i t . , pp .311-316.
1 ° lb id . , p.330.
 ^^ Asiaweek, 18 May 1986, pp .23-31.
* ^ Asiaweek, 11 October 1985. p.22.
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Possib le  Instability in A SE A N
Indonesia is especially interested in maintaining stability within ASEAN. It is 
interested not only because it is a member country of ASEAN, but also because ASEAN 
was the first regional venture undertaken by Indonesia and established on Indonesian 
term s .19 Jakarta  believes tha t  the stability of ASEAN can only be achieved by internal 
stability of all its member countries / 1 Thus the gradual loss of control by Marcos 
threatened to portend the introduction of instability to a region that ,  except for the 
Indochina conflicts, had seen an unusual period of continuity and m aintenance of the 
sta tus quo. That the instability of one member of ASEAN could have repercussions for 
other countries, most pertinantly Indonesia itself, was a serious concern to Indonesia. This 
concern was not new. It was recognised in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord that
the stability of each member state and of the ASEAN region is an essential 
contribution to international peace and security. Each member resolves to 
eliminate threats posed by subversion to its stability, thus strengthening 
national and ASEAN resilience/ 1
As Leifer explains:
The underlying rationale of that statement was tha t  political stability was 
indivisible among the ASEAN states and conversely, that any incidence of 
political instability in any one state would have repercussions for all the 
others. ^
Evidence of the Indonesian concern can be traced in the opinions expressed in Indonesian 
newspaper editorials, which reflect government opinion. In one editiorial it was suggested 
that Filipino communists in the Philippines were gaining in number not because of any 
allegiance to the communist party but because they were ‘fervently anti-Marcos and
19Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign P o l icy , p p .119-120. One reason why Indonesia refused to join an 
expanded ASA was because it did no t  ensure a prim ary role for Indonesia within the region. It 
wanted  an organisation  which would prom ote  Indonesia’s leadership within the region. The only 
way th is  could be done was by establish ing an organisation in which Indonesia could ‘s tam p  its 
own im p r in t  on regional co o pe ra t ion ’.
20 Indonesian O bserver , 6 Novem ber 1985. Expressed in the  editorial was the s ta tem en t th a t  
‘W ha tever  their  causes and nature ,  we in Indonesia and our ASEAN friends are much concerned 
abou t the  security and in tegrity  of t he Philippines, which is vital for its con tribu tion  to s tabili ty  in 
Sou theas t  Asia .’
2i
Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign P o l icy , p.162.
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0 9
seeking a change1/ '*  This  clearly reflected the views of the Indonesian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. In an interview with Asiaweek, the present Foreign Minister of Indonesia, 
M ock tar  K u su m aa tm a d ja  s ta ted  th a t
the biggest failure of the Marcos government was th a t  they neglected rural 
developm ent.  The unrest  stems from th a t .  The resurgence of the communist
o  i
par ty  there is basically an agricultural m a t t e r / 2 *4
A t the sam e time, Indonesia was also dismayed a t  the level of communist 
insurgency within the Philippines, which stem m ed from the failure of Marcos to address 
problem s of in ternal discord. Not only was the Philippines a close neighbour of
o r
Indonesia^' , the Indonesian military m ust have compared their experience of the PK1 in
the  1960s with the  dangers facing the Philippine military a t  th a t  present time. To them,
th e  Philippine arm y appeared on the defensive. The A F P  was seen to lack US military
su p p o rt  and aid because of the investigations by the US Congress into the alleged
mishandling of the  economy under M a r c o s /0 As such Indonesia would have welcomed
any tough measures th a t  Marcos took to contain both the com m unists  and the deepening 
9 7political c r i s i s /
As the  crisis deepened in the Philippines, the Indonesians could not see any 
a l te rn a t iv e  to Marcos. They saw only a s tark  choice between him and the communists in 
the  countryside. It was in response to these concerns and in the absence of a viable 
a l te rna t ive ,  th a t  the Indonesians displayed their support for Marcos. At this time, the 
dem ocratic  opposition in the Philippines was still disunited and remained as such until 
the final m onth  and a half preceding the presidential elections. S u h a r to ’s support for 
Marcos was conveyed through the then Labour Minister Blas F Ople, who was in Ja k a r ta  
in the first week of December for the 10th Asian Regional Conference of the International
2**T he  Jakar t  a P o s t , 11 Ju ly  1985.
A siaweek, 4 M ay 1986, p.39.
25 Indonesian O bserver , 8 M ay 1985. It was s ta ted  in an article th a t  the  strength of the 
P h i l ipp ine  com m unis ts  ‘should be taken as a warn ing  to all of us, because the P hil ipp ines’ Republic 
is the  home of the ‘guys next d o o r” .
26IbKL
27 W eatherbee ,  Donald  B, ‘T he  Philippines Under Aquino in A S E A N ’, prepared for the panel 
T he  Aquino Regime in R e tro sp ec t , Association for Asian Studies, 39th Annual Meeting, Boston, 12 
April 1987, p.5.
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o  o
Labour O rganisation . S u h a r to  also authorized the loan of two military transport
OQ
aircraf t  m anufactured  in Indonesia ‘to  be placed a t  the disposal of President Marcos’. 
Significantly, the Indonesian delegation which accompanied the two planes to  the 
Philippines was headed by the  Indonesian a rm y ’s Chief-of-Staff, General Benny
on
M urdani.  While in the  Philippines, M urdani again reiterated  Indonesia’s concerns 
s ta ting ,  ‘We w ant s tability  in this region and if anyone of our neighbours is not stable it
9  1
would immediately affect u s .’oA
U S  B a se s  in th e  P h i l ip p in e s
Indonesian concern a t  the t im e of the Philippine crisis extended beyond perceptions 
of a  th rea t  to regional s tab il ity  via possible disruptions to ASEAN. Ja k a r ta  also had
9 0
reason to fear an upset to  the  regional balance of power’,z The Philippines houses the two 
largest US military bases in the  Pacific region, Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Force 
Base. W ithin Indonesia, however, the civilians in government on the one hand, 
represented by the M inistry  of Foreign Affairs, and the army on the other, differed over 
their a t t i tu d e s  tow ards the  Americans and the m ost preferable balance of power in the
9 9
r e g i o n . A l t h o u g h  both groups agreed th a t  Indonesia should play the primary role in 
Southeast Asia, they recognised th a t  a t  present it is not within Indonesia’s capacity to do 
so. The disagreement remained over how far Indonesia’s foreign policy could lean 
tow ards the West w ithou t compromising its non-aligned principles. Since the ‘New O rder’ 
governm ent of Suharto  came to  power, Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry tried to steer an 
‘independent, and ac tive’ non-aligned foreign policy inspite of the large measure of aid and 
economic help) obtained from the West. The m ilitary, however, in placing ‘security 
considerations above all else ... in many cases expected to obtain immediate economic
28
Business T im e s , 7 December 1985.
29 Ibid. The  two planes were on loan to the Philippines perhaps reflecting Indonesian recognition 
of the poor economic s i tuation  in the Philippines, thus sparing Marcos the further  em barrassm ent 
of having to pay for aircraft when his c o u n t ry ’s economy was in ta t te rs .
’’^ S tra its  T im e s , 7 Ja n u a ry  1986.
9  1
J a k a r ta  P o s t , 10 J a n u a ry  1986.
32 Leifer, Foreign Relations of the  New S ta te s , p.103.
<>0Crouch, o p .c i t . , p.330.
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benefits from a policy of closer cooperation with the United S ta tes .’ Further,  the 
m il i ta ry ’s experience with the com m unists , especially the bloody 1965 PKI coup, made 
them  extremely an ti-com m unist .  This suspicion of communism also extended to the
o r
Soviet Union even though the Kremlin pursued an anti-Chinese policy. Therefore, 
despite the views of the Foreign Ministry, the army developed closer links with the US.0 
However, the differences between the army and Foreign Ministry existed more in terms of 
degree than  substance, for on the whole Indonesia did desire th a t  the US maintain  its 
presence in Southeast Asia until such t im e Indonesian capability for the projection of its 
influence in the region improved.
For these reasons there  was much concern in Indonesia as to w hat the Philippine 
crisis m ean t for the US bases in the Philippines, as the preservation of these bases would 
determ ine the extent of a  continuing US presence in the region. T h a t  the US should 
remain in the region was param oun t given perceptions of expanding Soviet and Chinese 
power and interest in the region. Indonesia did not w ant the US to abandon the region 
since this would leave C h ina  and the Soviet Union as prime contenders to fill the vacuum
*y n
left by the receding US m ilitary  prescence. Evidence of Indonesia’s concern over the US 
bases is again reflected in Indonesian newspaper editorials which highlight the growing 
Soviet influence and its negative effect on the balance of power in the region should the
o  o
US leave. °  Indonesia considered it had no alternative  to Marcos since the only other 
possibility seemed to be com m unist control in the Philippines. If the Philippine 
governm ent was to fall to the com m unists  the lease for the US bases would certainly be 
te rm inated .
34lbid .,  p.331.
' ‘'’Ib id . , pp .334-335. See also Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy , p p .124-127.
' Ib id . , pp .337-338. See also Asiaweek, 4 M ay 1986, p.39. In an interview, Indonesian Foreign 
M inister  M ochtar  replied to a question on the th re a t  of the Soviet naval presence in Southeast Asia 
th a t ,  ‘if the Americans had base facilities in the  Philippines, there could be no objections to the 
Russians having them in V ie tn a m .’
° 7
Fifield, Russell, H, N a t iona l  and Regional In teres ts  in ASEAN: C om peti tion  and Cooperation 
in In terna t ional  Politics , In s t i tu te  of Sou theas t  Asian Studies, Occasional P ap e r  57, Singapore, 
1979, p p .31-32.
*> o
00Ja.karta  P o s t , 6 S ep tem ber  1985 and 5 N ovem ber  1985. The  Septem ber editorial reiterated a 
recent Tokyo announcem ent t h a t  ‘Soviet m il i ta ry  s trength  continues to  grow in the  Asian arena, 
po ten tia l ly  posing a th rea t  along the Pacific rim and into the South Pacific and Indian Oceans.’ 
T he  Russians ‘seek to convert their  growing m il ita ry  m ight into political advantage,  and two 
regions mentioned in th a t  con tex t  are the P hilipp ines and Indonesia .’ The November editorial 
points  ou t the difficult s itua tion  the  Americans are in with regard to the ir  bases in the Philippines.
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M a r c o s  or A q u in o ?
It would appear th a t  Indonesia, because of its concerns discussed above, supported 
Marcos. The s trongest confirmation of this would appear to be the loan of the two 
Indonesian-m anufactured a ircraft to Marcos. However, since the offer of the two planes 
took place between S u h ar to  and Ople in early December 1985 before the non-communist 
opposition had united behind Aquino and her running m ate  Salvador Laurel in late 
December, it cannot be certa in  th a t  had Suharto  known of the intentions of Aquino and 
Laurel he would still have given his support  to Marcos. Suharto  might still have been 
inclined to  lean tow ards M arcos because Aquino was an unknown. W hat is certain is th a t  
during  the period of acu te  instability  and uncerta in ty  which accompanied the mass rallies 
and dem onstra tions  preceding the elections, the Indonesian leaders were deeply concerned. 
Moreover, they would have dreaded the prospect th a t  the communists m ight be able to 
take  advan tage  of the  s i tua tion  to fur ther infiltrate the populace while the two non­
com m unist  parties ba t t led  it out a t the elections. Finally, J a k a r ta  would have been 
concerned th a t  Aquino would revoke the Philippine-US Bases Agreement reached between 
Marcos and the US. Her speeches before the elections indicated this possibility.
However, if the u l t im ate  choice was to be between Aquino or the com m unists  as an 
a l te rna t ive  to Marcos, the Indonesians, and  the rest of ASEAN, were more than  willing to 
accept Aquino.4() Thus, a lthough Marcos declared himself the winner in a  narrowly won, 
fraud-wracked election, the Indonesians did not send their custom ary note of 
congratu la tions  to Marcos. The crisis a t  th a t  point made the prospect of civil war a 
d is tinc t possibility unless Marcos backed down. This would only have been to the 
advan tage  of the com m unists . M ochtar, therefore, s ta ted  th a t  there were ‘o ther factors' 
involved which needed to  be considered before reaching a decision on the Marcos 
‘v ic to ry ’.* 4* Ultimately w h a t  was im p o rtan t  to the Indonesians was stability  in the 
Philippines and thereby w ith in  ASEAN. It had become clear th a t  Marcos could not
*y q
The fact that he sent his Chief-of-Staff Murdani could be construed as showing Indonesian 
concern over the Philippine issue and also so that Murdani could report to him on the situation 
after meeting with Marcos and Ver. ^
4^Weatherbee, op.cit., p.5.
4 * Straits T im es, 21 February 1986.
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control the situation any longer, and in spite of his long association with the leaders in 
Indonesia, the Indonesian priority was towards the region. Their priorities were confirmed 
later when the Jakar ta  government stated tha t  it would not allow Marcos asylum in 
Indonesia, respecting Aquino’s call on her ASEAN neighbours not to receive Marcos into 
their countries. z
T h e  P h i l ip p in e s  U n d e r  A q u in o
Indonesia perceived Aquino to be a moderate leader, who was not communist, but 
was popular with the people of the Philippines. They were pleased that Aquino recognised 
and accepted the importance of ASEAN for the region. She underlined this by choosing 
to visit Indonesia and Singapore before visiting the US during her first overseas trip. 
Indonesian new-found faith in Aquino was also vindicated over the issue of the US bases 
in the Philippines. Aquino decided to honour the Philippine-US Bases Agreement reached 
under Marcos. The main problem now was that the new Philippine constitution declared 
the Philippines a nuclear-free country. Filipinos were aware that the other ASEAN 
countries preferred tha t  the bases should remain, but they were also aware that the rest 
of ASEAN was getting a ‘free ride’ due to the security which the bases brought to the 
region. The Indonesians and the rest of ASEAN probably attempted to give Aquino the 
same advice that they gave to Marcos, that is, to allow the US bases to remain in the 
Philippines.* 4'' Whether this is successful or not would only be known after 1991, when a 
plebicite is to be held to decide the issue. Although opposition to the US bases is vocal 
and growing, it does not as yet constitute a majority. Moreover, they bring in US$1 
billion annually in rent to an economy that is in deep trouble.4’’ There do exist other 
facilities in the rest of ASEAN where some of the Philippine facilities can be duplicated,
4^Straits Times, 25 August 1986.
4°Weatherbee, op, cit. p p .15-18.
44 International Herald Tribune, 3 October 1985. In a nationwide poll conducted in September 
1985, 43% of Filipinos surveyed agreed that the US bases should be kept or tolerated, while only 
23% disagreed.
4 5 •Asiaweek, 2 August 1985, pp.14-16. See also Asian Defence Journal, December 1986, p.22. It 
is not only the US$1 billion in rent that has to be considered but also removal of the US bases 
would mean the disappearance of employment for 37,000 Filipinos, as well as the amounts of 
money, estimated at some US$300 million annually, that US servicemen spend in the Philippines.
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b u t  the  US military do not consider these of sufficient s tandard  relative to  those in the 
Philippines. The o ther problem is of course th a t  very few of the o ther ASEAN countries 
w an t the US bases in their terr itory . The Indonesian a t t i tu d e  especially has been well 
docum ented. Both in Sukarno 's  and in S u h ar to ’s era the Indonesians have insisted th a t  
the phrase
th a t  all foreign bases are tem porary  and remain only with the expressed 
concurrence of the  countries concerned
be included in regional agreem ents of the Maphilindo M anila Agreements of 1963, and the 
ASEAN Bangkok Declaration of 1967 respectively.
W ha t further perturbed the Indonesians was the initial a t te m p t  by Aquino to 
negotiate  with the com m unists  instead of fighting them  as Marcos had done. There was a 
m easure of concern th a t  she was too naive abou t who the com m unists were and what 
com m unism  was all abou t .  The Indonesians could do little to affect w ha t  after all was 
an internal m a t te r  for the Philippines. However, during her visit to Indonesia the problem 
of com m unist insurgency was high on the agenda of bilateral talks with Suharto. It was 
pointed out th a t  such advice came from a country  which had successfully passed through
A &
the political phase of national consolidation which the Philippines was experiencing. 
Indonesia, in con tras t  with the Philippines, had defeated the com m unists - they had not 
done so through negotiations. Aquino, however, made it clear th a t  although she respected 
the  Indonesian leader and valued Indonesia’s friendship, she would handle the communists 
in her own way, and this was through com m unication and negotiation. Only if this failed 
would she resort to arms. Aquino preferred this m ethod as she felt th a t ,  aft,er Marcos, 
the Philippines required a period of national reconciliation.
However, it would have come as a  relief to  the Indonesians th a t  Aquino’s 
negotiations w ith the com m unists  broke dow n and fighting resumed. The Indonesians felt 
that  negotiations and the ceasefire only contribu ted  further to com m unist entrenchm ent 
in the Philippine countryside. The interval would only be used to consolidate communist
^ ’Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy , p.121.
^ Asian Wall Street J o u r n a l , 7 April 1986. 
48 S tra i ts  T im e s . 25 August 1986.
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p o s i t io n s .^  In spite  of these differences, A quino’s visit to Indonesia was highly
successful. The Indonesians appreciated Aquino’s gesture towards Indonesia and ASEAN 
symbolised by her v i s i t . I n  the light of these developments, relations between Indonesia 
and the Philippines appear to have had a good s ta r t .  T im e will only tell as to  w hether the 
two countries will grow closer together.
*^F ar  Eastern Economic Review Asia Yearbook 1987, p.156. 
50T he  N a t io n . 25 August 1986.
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C h a p t e r  T h r e e
S i n g a p o r e - P h i l i p p i n e s  R e l a t i o n s
In trod uction
P as t  relations between Singapore and the Philippines have not been antagonistic, 
with few, if any, bilateral d isputes between them. Unlike Indonesia, Singapore and the 
Philippines had both experienced easy routes to independence. Neither faced the sorts of 
underlying irr i tan ts  which m arred the relationship between Indonesia and the Philippines, 
and which resulted in sudden fluctuations in Indonesian-Philippines relations before the 
formation of ASEAN. However, there were few reasons to improve ties between Singapore 
and Manila. Relations, though generally good, remained dis tan t.
After the formation of ASEAN in 1967, bilateral Singapore-Philippines relations 
remained s tag n an t  for two reasons. First,  Singapore was preoccupied with its two closest 
neighbours, M alaysia and Indonesia. Both were larger than  Singapore and had 
predom inantly  Malay populations. The Philippines was considered too geographically 
remote to  be of im mediate concern to Prim e Minister Lee Kuan Yew. Indeed, Singapore 
had not long been separated from M alaysia .1 Bad feeling persisted between Malaysia and 
Singapore for some time after separation. Singapore-Indonesia relations were also not in 
the best of health. Indonesian armed confrontation  against Malaysia, including Singapore 
at the time part of the Federation , had ju s t  ended. Moreover, the 1965 coup a t tem p t  in 
Indonesia had led to anti-Chinese riots as par t  of the an ti-com m unist purge which 
followed. This aspect of the Indonesian domestic scene had worried the leaders of 
predom inantly  Chinese Singapore. Then in 1968, after ASEAN had been in existence for 
only one year, Singapore executed two Indonesian commandos captured after exploding
1Separation of Singapore from the Federation of Malaysia took place on 9 August 1965.
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bombs in the country’s business district. The execution took place despite a personal plea 
from President Suharto to Prime Minister Lee. Although ASEAN remained intact due 
largely to the skill of the then Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik, Indonesia- 
Singapore relations took on a decidedly downward turn.
The second reason which explains the stagnation of Singapore-Philippines relations 
after 1967 lies in what was arguably Prime Minister Lee’s lack of enthusiasm for 
ASEAN.^ Singapore had joined up only on the ‘conviction tha t  no harm and some good 
might come of i t .’° Since Singapore foreign policy was dominated by Lee Singapore did 
not as a whole involve itself too much in ASEAN affairs. Lee’s lack of interest was clearly 
indicated by the fact th a t  by 1972 he had visited Europe and the US several times but 
had not visited an ASEAN nation in an official capacity.^ Lee doubted the utility of 
ASEAN, believing tha t  weaker members benefitted most from the organisation. As a 
consequence Lee delegated much of the work on ASEAN-Singapore matters to then 
Foreign Minister Rajaratnam.
In the early 1970s, as the regional situation in Southeast Asia changed, so too did 
Lee’s perceptions of ASEAN. Although in 1970 Singapore was already stressing the 
necessity for ASEAN to solve the region’s economic and social problems, the series of 
communist victories in Indochina served to galvanise ASEAN into a more dynamic 
organisation. Singapore, in common with the other ASEAN states recognised
tha t  South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia had fallen due to, at least in part, 
weaknesses in their internal political, social and economic systems. Most ASEAN 
states made efforts to put (heir individual houses in order.0
The Vietnam war, moreover, had led to the Nixon doctrine and the reduction of
9 .
z O baid  Ul-haq, ‘Foreign P o licy ’, in Q uah , Jon  (et al), G overnm ent and Politics of S ingapore , 
(Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1985), p.279. As in most small newly independent states, 
foreign policy is essentially an ‘e l i t is t’ enterprise. Obaid sta tes th a t  ‘foreign policy decisions are 
invariably  m ade by a handfu l of top political leaders.’ This is more so the  case in Singapore in 
te rm s of S ingapore’s P rim e M inister  of tw en ty  years, Lee K uan  Yew.
9
l’R au ,  R obert  L, ‘The Role of Singapore in A S E A N ’, C on tem porary  Southeast A sia , Vol.3, N o.2, 
Sep tem ber  1981, p.102.
^ W ila ira t ,  Kawin, S ingapore’s Foreign P o l icy , In s t i tu te  of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 
Field R eport  No. 10, 1975, p.80. Lee had holidays in Cameron Highlands in M alaysia and m ade a 
brief s top-over in Thai land  once on his way to the US. This was the ex ten t  of his visits to ASEAN 
countries.
°R a u ,  o p .c i t . , p.106.
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American com m itm en t to Southeast Asia. This began to worry leaders in Singapore since 
the country  professed itself to be ‘non-aligned in all aspects but security .’^ In m atters  of 
security , Singapore was clearly aligned with the West. Increasingly, therefore, ASEAN 
became more im p o r tan t  for Singapore as power alignm ents shifted within and beyond the 
region. The fluidity in in ternational relations with which Singapore was obliged to deal 
could be seen for example in
rapprochem ent between China and the West, ... the move of other ASEAN 
countries tow ards an accommodation with her; ... the raising of the Russian 
profile in the region and the increasing Sino-Soviet rivalry; and the growing
o
Japanese  dom ination  of the economies of Southeast Asia.
In economic term s ASEAN had simultaneously become more a ttrac tive .  It was hoped 
th a t  in trade negotiations a unified ASEAN would be able to contend with the 
industrialised nations from a position of s trength  denied to individual Southeast Asian 
s ta tes  operating alone.^ Singapore was made clearly aware of this during the 1973 oil 
crisis which underlined its economic vulnerab ility .* 1*^ Finally, Singapore’s survival 
depended ultimately on its neighbours. Singapore was
willy-nilly a p a r t  of Southeast Asia, dependent on her neighbours for such 
vital things as her w ater supply, food, and raw m ateria ls  and th a t ,  because of 
her size and location and economic s truc tu re ,  it is difficult for her to be insulated 
from the repercussions of her neighbours’ foreign policies and internal politics .11
1 9
As such relations between Singapore and its ASEAN neighbours began to improve. The 
realization of the contribution which ASEAN could make to the promotion of Singapore’s
6 Ibid., p.100.
"Lee Khoon Choy, ‘Foreign Policy’, in C V Devan Nair (ed), Socialism that Works, (Singapore, 
Federal Publications,1976), p.108. Moreover, the country’s close links with the West is related to 
the ‘imperatives of economic development’. The major part of trade and investment in Singapore is 
with the West.
8
Wilairat, op.cit., p.80.
"^ Lau Teik Soon, ‘The Role of Singapore in Southeast Asia’, World Review, Vol.9, No.3, August 
1980, pp.38-39.
I ^Turnbull, C M, A History of Singapore 1819-1975, (Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 
1977), p.332.
II Wilairat, op .cit. , p.80.
1 o
Minchin, James, No Man is an Island: A Study of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew, (Sydney, Allen 
and Unwin, 1986), pp.173-174. Lee’s personal relation with Suharto improved accordingly after his 
1973 visit to Indonesia. Lee now has regular ‘four-eyes’ meetings with Suharto. In 1985, during 
Lee's visit to Indonesia, the Indonesians presented him with gifts normally reserved for a king, 
receiving him in a traditional Bugis ceremony.
50
security and wider national interests made it im perative th a t  Singapore should adopt a 
higher profile within the region and develop a greater interest in the affairs of the other 
members.
S in g a p o re  R e a c t io n  to  th e  P o l i t ic a l  C ris is  in  th e  P h i l ip p in e s
Actual or potential instability in the Philippines will always be of great concern to 
Singapore’s leaders. In 1986, however, Singapore was less concerned with the possibility 
of a ‘spill-over' effect th an  were the Indonesians. It was not concerned th a t  the ‘February 
revolu tion’ in the Philippines m ight occur in Singapore. This lack of concern resulted from 
an awareness th a t  the populations of the two nations experienced totally  different 
conditions. Singapore’s s tandard  of living and economic development differed markedly 
from the corrupt,  poverty-stricken economy evident in the Philippines. The living 
s tan d ard s  of Singaporeans were higher than  those of Filipinos. In spite of the dominance 
of Lee’s leadership, ‘few Singaporeans yet believe they have anyth ing  to gain by
1 9
rebellion. Many d o n ’t w an t Singapore to be w ithou t Lee and the leadership he heads. 
Singaporeans prefer to  show their displeasure a t  specific government policies through the 
ballot box; as occurred in the last general election of December 1984, when a 12.6% swing 
was recorded against Lee’s People’s Action P arty  ( P A P ) . ^  Moreover, the Singapore 
governm ent has effectively contained internal security th rea ts  through measures like the 
Internal Security Act (ISA ).1'’
Prim e Minister Lee’s concern over the instability in the Philippines caused by 
M arcos’ snap presidential elections, focusses instead on the highly vulnerable character of 
Singapore as a small island sta te ,  faced with certain ‘l im itations imposed by geography, 
dem ography, economy’, a n d  s ituated  in a region governed by global and regional 
balances of pow'er which might become adverse. The island is small by any standard . The
13Ibid., p.26.
^ Far Eastern Economic Review , 8 January 1987, p.52.
*°Lau Teik Soon, ‘Threat Perceptions of Singapore’, in Morrison, Charles E (ed), Threats to 
Security in East Asia-Pacific: National and Regional Perspectives, (USA, D C Heath and 
Company, 1983), pp.115-121.
^S in gh ,  Bilveer, ‘Singapore’s Management of its Security Problems’, Asia Pacific Comm unity, 
Summer 1985, p.80.
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predominantly Chinese population feels itself surrounded by a ‘Malay Sea’ comprising 
numerically larger and often difficult Malay neighbours. Singapore remains devoid of 
natural resources making it almost totally dependent on world trade and ‘highly 
vulnerable to the vagaries of world trade cycles’. Because of these factors, the country’s 
leadership has become imbued with a ‘do or die’ attitude; one mistake, it is believed, 
could be fatal. This awareness of Singapore’s vulnerability led to great interest in the 
Philippine political crisis for two basic reasons; first, a concern that growing communist 
insurgency in the Philippines might exploit such instability to bring about another 
communist regime in Southeast Asia; and second, a concern that the US bases might be 
closed if a new regime were to come to power, communist or non-communist.
Possib le Instab ility  in A SE A N
Having found tha t  after all ASEAN was important to Singapore, Lee threw his 
weight behind the organisation. After 1975 he went about orchestrating a new
i  o
prominance for ASEAN. Lee coupled this newly aquired zeal for ASEAN with a pro- 
Western a ttitude and established himself as a staunch anti-communist. Lee believed that 
communism had the strength and the organisation to ‘wreak havoc on the global scene 
either on its own account or if connected to other, smaller sources of conflict’. ^  Despite 
this, Singapore continues to trade with communist countries for pragmatic reasons. Trade 
and economic links ensure that socialist countries have an interest in the survival of 
Singapore. It also ensures that Singapore does not lose its independence and ‘become a
o  r\
pawn of any single big powder in the big power rivalry and conflict in Southeast Asia’/
Lee saw that  the situation in the Philippines in t he 1980s could have w'orked only to 
the benefit of the communists. By late 1984 the Singapore government realised the 
growing danger that a poverty-stricken Philippines might turn to the Communist Party 
of the Philippines. The centre pages of the pro-government newspaper, Straits Times,
* "ib id ., pp.78-80. For a fuller account of Singapore’s problems see Lau Teik Soon, ‘Threat 
Perceptions of Singapore’, in op.cit., pp. 114-123.
18 Lee Boon Hiok, ‘Constraints on Singapore’s Foreign Policy’, Asian Survey, Vol.XXII, No.6, 
June 1982, pp.529-530.
^M inch in , op.c it. , pp.192-193.
20Lee Khoon Choy, op.cit., p.109.
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continually focused on the growing communist insurgency in the Philippine countryside.
An editorial in the S tra i ts  Times in December 1984 urged the Philippine leadership to
99
heed the ‘w arning signs’ of the deepening troubles in the Philippine domestic s c e n e /  
The possibility of a com m unist  victory was considered detr im ental  to Singapore, for the 
following reasons. It would upset the s ta tu s  quo and reduce investors’ confidence in the 
r e g io n / 0 To an in troverted  but outward-looking country like Singapore, dependent on 
trade and investm ent,  th is  would mean its economic death-knell. After the Vietnamese 
invasion of K am puchea, Lee developed a ‘refined domino th eo ry ’ addressing possible 
com m unist take-over of Thailand . This theory can be extended to cover the case of the 
Philippines. On th a t  earlier occasion he stated  th a t
... I have seen governments collapse and whole peoples destroyed; because I 
have seen leaders ... become refugees ... therefore I recognise how vital the 
security and s tability  of our ASEAN neighbours is to us. Today it is Thailand 
which is th rea tened . Tom orrow , it can be any one of us. W ithou t  ASEAN 
cooperation and solidarity , one by one, we can be subverted and manipulated.
Once revolution and strife upset stability , investm ents, development and 
properity will vanish. We shall all be refugees.24
Lee also expressed fears of the insiduous na tu re  of com m unist insurgency. Although 
the th rea t  from the C P M  has diminished over the years, it has taken time for the 
Singapore leaders to relax their guard against com m unism  accordingly. The old guard of 
the P A P  which remains in power has not forgotten its experience with communism in the 
1950s. They had come too close to losing the ba t t le  against the communists in
o r
S in g a p o re /0 Indeed this b it te r  experience was to lead to Lee’s extrem e caution on the 
question of establishing ties with China. Because of its predominantly Chinese
21
S tra i ts  T im e s , 27 Novem ber 1984. T h ro u g h o u t  the  last m on ths  of 1984 and the  beginning of 
1985 the S tra its  T im es published a greater num ber of reports  on the  com m unis t  problem in the 
Philippines.
" ^ S tra i ts  T im e s , 11 December 1984.
2oSingh, op .c i t . , p p .86-87.
24Ibid.,p.88.
^ ' 'T u rnbu l l ,  op .c i t . , p p .271-293. See also Minchin, o p .c i t . , p p .81-98 and p p .115-119. The P A P  in 
the 1950s had consituted both com m unist arid non-com m unist  members, as the more left-wing of 
the pa r ty  had populari ty  with the Chinese-educated which were a m ajor i ty  in Singapore at the 
time. In Ju ly  1961 these com m unists  disagreed with the  proposal for merger with M alaya and split 
with the  non-com m unist  group of Lee, Toh Chin Chye, Goh Keng Swee and R a ja ra tn a m ,  to form a 
separate  pa r ty  the Barisan Socialis. The  P A P  organisa tion  was a lm ost crippled. It was only 
gradually  and with great risks th a t  Lee, Toh, Goh and R a ja ra tn a m  were able to get the better of 
the com m unists  in the par ty .
53
population , Singapore has said th a t  it will be the last ASEAN nation to establish 
d ip lom atic  relations with China. This is largely because Singapore does not wish its 
neighbours to perceive th a t  it can in any way be construed as a  ‘Third C h ina’. Moreover, 
Singapore leaders fear th a t  in the absence of any strong national identity the overseas 
Chinese in Singapore still have feelings of loyalty tow ards China. Similarly, if the 
com m unists  in the Philippines were to profit and grow from the instability th a t  resulted 
from the  political crisis in the Philippines, there would be an influx of subversive influence 
in Singapore and other neighbouring countries. T he degree of vigilance on the part  of the 
Singapore government against com m unist influence can be seen in the recent arrest of an 
a p p a ren t  M arxist group made up of church and social workers.
U S  B a s e s  in  t h e  P h i l i p p i n e s
Lee’s concern over the fu ture of the US bases in the Philippines has its roots in his 
perceptions of the regional balance of power. Singapore is pro-American, is fearful of the 
presently increasing Soviet presence in the  region, and therefore, wishes to see a
o n
counterw eight preponderance of American power in Southeast A s i a / 0 Lee has become 
more anti-Soviet since the Vietnamese inavsion of K am puchea in December 1978, and 
considers the Soviet Union as the country th a t  has made such Vietnamese aggression
o  n
p o s s ib le /  It is therefore not, enthusiastic ab o u t  the Malaysian neutra lization  proposal of 
1971 th a t  Southeast Asia become a Zone of Peace, Freedom and N eutrality  (Z O PFAN). 
For Singapore ZO PF AN was merely an ideal and acceptable as such. The most im portant 
reality was the continuence of
external involvement and the impotence of the region to s top larger and more 
powerful s ta tes  which, in pursuit  of their policies, may do something we do not 
like or is contrary to our well-being. R ather than  keeping out all outsiders, 
therefore, it would be better  for as many interested powers as possible to come 
in and develop) a s take in the region, thereby ensuring th a t  no single great power
o o
gets into a  dom inant position.
Wilson, Dick, The Neutralization of Souteast Asia, (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1975), 
pp.83-84.
27
Lau, ‘The Role of Singapore in Southeast Asia’, op .c it . , pp.40-41. Vietnamese aggression is 
attibuted to Soviet support and Lee feels that they can and should be contained by the US. See also 
Lau Teik Soon, ‘Threat Perceptions of Singapore’, op .c it . , p p .121-123.
^ W ila ir a t ,  op.cit., p.97.
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According to Singapore while the balance of power developed in Southeast Asia a 
balance of interest should also develop. Each great power should nurture its stake in 
maintaining the status quo. Moreover, Singapore leaders also believed that the presence of 
all the major powers in the region would improve the chances of survival for their 
c i ty -s ta te /  Singapore’s ports remain open to trade with the Soviet Union and other 
communist countries as well as, with the Americans.
In spite of this foreign policy orientation Lee’s fears increased with the ascendency 
of the Soviet Union in the 1970s while the US followed an opposite course and suffered a 
series of set-backs. Although there is still belief in the need for multipolarity in Southeast 
Asia, the Soviet Union is regarded with suspicion and uncertainty. The Kampuchean 
conflict involved two great communist powers, China and the Soviet Union. China is 
regarded by Singapore with less suspicion since it is clearly on the side of ASEAN with 
regard to Kampuchea. The Soviet Union is regarded with greater suspicion because of its 
support for Vietnam. Since ASEAN cannot force the Soviets from the region it is 
imperative to Singapore tha t  the Americans remain in sufficient strength to counter the 
Soviet U n io n /  Lee therefore, remains in support of the continued strong presence of 
American forces in the region, specifically the key US bases at Clarke Air Field and Subic 
Naval Base.
For Singapore it is important that the US maintains its presence in Southeast Asia 
in the form of its two bases in the Philippines. Singapore thereby avoids the difficulties 
which would result from having to provide alternative facilities if the US was obliged to 
relocate their bases. This reluctance, common to other ASEAN countries, was expressed 
by Singapore’s First Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong when questioned as to 
whether Singapore might provide alternative sites for the US forces in the region. He 
replied.
Do you know the length of the outer perimeter of Clark Air Base? The length 
of the outer perimeter of Clark Air Base is 26 miles. That is exactly the length 
of Singapore. * 
^ S i n g h ,  op .c i t . , p.91. 
' '^O baid ,  op .c i t . , p p .292-296.
*y i
W eatherbee ,  op .c i t . , p.18.
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However, facilities are available or could be established in Singapore for use by American
o o
naval forces especially with regard to requirem ents for com m unications and repair. The 
real question is not one of S ingapore’s capability but its willingness to comply should the 
American forces be obliged to move. Ultimately Singapore is com m itted  to  a US presence 
in the region. It is the  m ost hawkish ASEAN member concerning the K am puchea issue 
and the Soviets continued support  of V ietnam  in this military venture.
In the end, however, Singapore m ight have to provide some sort of assistence to the 
US if it was forced to move. To prevent such an event, Lee would prefer th a t  the US
90
remain in the Philippines for reasons of personal pride00 and because Singapore 
ultim ately  would not be able to provide a suitable alternative  to the US bases in the 
Philippines. If forced to  move from the Philippines the US would in the event be a less 
effective force in the Asian region.
M a r co s  or A q u in o ?
By the early m onths  of 1986, P rim e Minister Lee’s concern with the political crisis 
in the Philippines was governed by his changing perceptions of A SEA N ’s importance, 
S ingapore’s vulnerability to external th rea ts  to the region’s s tability , as well as the 
changing balance of power in Southeast Asia. This was especially so since the decline of 
the Philippine economy had made it the weak link in ASEAN, while the o ther ASEAN 
countries had all improved t heir economies since 1967. Lee foresaw grave consequences for 
the rest of Southeast Asia from the potential for instability in the Philippines. 
S ingapore’s pro-Western elite feared the loss of the US bases and hence a reduction in the 
US regional presence. The other major concern centred on the growing insurgency
90
US Congress, House of Representatives, C om m ittee  on Foreign Affairs, Assessing America’s 
O ptions in the P hil ipp ines, 23 F ebruary  1986, p p .75-89. Singapore has in fact been one of the areas 
th a t  the  US Navy had looked a t  with regard to  relocation of the bases in the  Philippines.
9 9
°°M inch in ,  op .c it . , p p .182-183. Lee has boasted , ‘I am the only chap in the  whole of Southeast 
Asia th a t  is not on the American payro ll .’ Minchin makes the point th a t  Lee, ‘is one of the few 
leaders to have ou tw itted  the  blunderbuss-wielding giant th a t  is the w orld ’s most powerful nation. 
S ingapore has no US m il ita ry  installations on her soil; the only American troops to come her way 
have merely been short- term  visitors on rest and recreat ion leave. She has no trea ty  th a t  obliges her 
to m ake facilities available on dem and, w hatever  her qualms. On the o ther  hand, she has acquired 
sophisticated  capability  in areas of her choice, ... she has received so much - the feting of the CIA 
and of successive adm inis tra t ions ,  preferential r ights to personnel tra in ing  and equipm ent,  high 
m u tin a t io n a l  corporate ra t ing  and input ...
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movement in the Philippines. With communist regimes established in Indochina, and a 
growing regional Soviet presence, reflected most clearly through the growth of the Soviet 
naval facility at Cam Ranh Bay, the prospect of communist rule in Manila would portend 
an alarming deterioration of the external Southeast Asian environment so important to 
the security of Singapore.
By late 1984 Lee’s concern over the prospect of instability in the Philippines had 
intensified. Not only did newsreports highlight the growing communist insurgency, 
awareness of growing Philippines instability had led to falling trade relations between the 
two nations. In January 1985, Lee hosted a meeting between senior ASEAN ministers and 
former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Although no concrete decisions were 
reached, discussions centred on Philippine instability, the growing communist insurgency,
O  A
and the effect of these developments on the presence of Clark Field and Subic Bay.04 
Because of these domestic problems the Philippines had not played an active role in
o r
ASEAN affairs for the past few years.0' During his visit to the US in October 1985, Lee’s 
views added to the strong pressure foreign policy advisers in the US were exerting on their 
president to act against M arcos.^  Newsweek reported tha t  Lee’s views were ‘powerfully 
held: he later told a private gathering tha t  Marcos was ‘living on borrowed kidneys’ and 
stopped just short of saying that the United States should take covert action to remove
o  n
him.’0 ' Reagan was prompted to send Senator Paul Laxalt to see Marcos.
It was no surprise tha t  Lee disliked Marcos as a person. He was a total opposite to 
Lee. Although Marcos admired or professed to admire Lee, Lee’s opinion of Marcos was
O O
low.00 The poor state of the Philippine economy, Manila’s growing insurgency problem 
and the lack of a successor to Marcos were probably an anathema to Lee. The Singapore 
leadership, particularly the old guard of the PAP. found the high level of corruption 
developed under Marcos difficult to understand:
° * F a r  Eastern Economic Asia Yearbook 1986, p.230. 
o0Lianhe Zaobao , 4 Ju ly  1986.
' ^ Newsweek, 5 Novem ber 1985, p.122.
° ^ Ib id . , p p .123-124.
38 Minchin, op .c i t . , p.184.
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Singapore ’s p u r ita n ic a l d rive  fo r in c o r ru p t ib il i ty  ... is ... a lm ost a re lig ion .
G oh Keng Swee once confided th a t lie rea lly  could no t unerstand w hy so m any 
governm ent o ffic ia ls  elsewhere were so greedy. D id  they no t earn enough 
le g itim a te ly  w ith o u t having  to  supp lem ent th e ir  incom e by robb ing  the  rest o f 
society?**^
H ow ever, despite his d is like  o f M arcos Lee was prepared to  develop d ip lo m a tic  
re la tio n s  w ith  M a n ila . He was governed in th is  decision by a num ber o f facto rs. F irs t, 
M arcos was as w ill in g  as Lee to  prope l A S E A N  econom ica lly  fo rw a rd . In 1976, d u rin g  
Lee’s v is it  to  M a n ila , he and M arcos signed a jo in t  s ta tem en t ca llin g  fo r ‘ increased 
econom ic cooperation and in it ia t iv e s  between the tw o  coun tries  and th e ir  th ree A S E A N  
p a r t n e r s . B o t h  w en t one step fu r th e r  by im p lem en ting  10% ta r i f f  reductions on a ll 
p ro du c ts  traded between the tw o  coun tries . Second, Lee lacked real in fluence over e ithe r 
M arcos or events in the P h ilipp ines . In no way was he able to  con tem p la te  the  p o ss ib ility  
o f m aneuvering  M arcos from  power, no m a tte r how desperate the level o f in s ta b il ity  in 
th a t co u n try . M oreover, fo r as long as M arcos rem ained in c o n tro l and continued  to  stand 
f irm  aga inst the N P A , h is stance w ou ld  be acceptable to  Singapore and the o the r A S E A N  
m em bers. Lee considered th a t u lt im a te ly , there  was no real oppos ition  leader able to  
tack le  M arcos and estab lish  a cred ib le  a lte rn a tiv e . Lee d id  however, exert a ll possible 
pressure to  influence events before the  P h ilip p in e  p o lit ic a l cris is  o f 1986. The P rim e 
M in is te r  expressed his views, in d ire c tly  b u t fo rce fu lly  th ro ug h  the on ly na tio n  capable o f 
b rin g in g  s ign ifican t pressure on M arcos, the  U nited  States. He d id  th is  d u rin g  his O ctober 
1985 v is it.
Despite his d is like  o f M arcos, Lee could w ell have been apprehensive o f the 
a lte rn a tiv e , Corazon A qu in o . W ith  her emergence in early 1986 as an oppos ition  leader, 
to  Lee the ‘ fo rm er housew ife ’ represented a weakening o f the c o u n try ’s leadership, faced 
as it, was w ith  a g row ing  insurgency p rob lem . D u rin g  the e lection , A q u in o ’s po licy  on 
counterinsurgency reflected her f irm  be lie f in non-vio lence. A q u in o  s ta te d  th a t there 
should be a ‘d ia logue between a ll the  forces o f the o p p o s itio n ’ , c lea rly  in c lu d in g  the 
co m m un is ts .^ * However, she was a llied  to  tw o  staunch a n ti-co m m u n is ts , E n rile  and
9 Q
F a r Eastern E conom ic R e v ie w , 8 J a n u a ry  1987, p.63.
^ F a r E astern E conom ic R e v iew , 28 J a n u a ry  1977, p.7.
41 F a r Eastern E conom ic R e v ie w , 19 D ecem ber 1985, p.41.
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Rarnos, who had deserted Marcos for Aquino after the elections.* 4*^ That Lee appreciated 
this factor and hoped tha t  the Enrile-Ramos duo would form the strength behind Aquino 
could be read between the lines of his personal letter to Enrile following the departure of 
Marcos. The tone of tha t  letter was warmer than the congratulatory notes he sent to 
both Aquino and Laurel.'*0 It was as if Lee felt that Enrile and Ramos were responsible 
for changing the course of history in the Philippines.4“* Moreover, after the rise of the 
Enrile-Ramos partnership Lee probably became more confident that with Aquino as a 
figure-head in a new anti-communist government, the US bases would remain on 
Philippine soil. Indeed, Aquino’s campaign platform had included the promise to allow 
the ‘current US bases lease to stand and ‘keep options open’ after 1991, consulting with 
ASEAN partners.’4'’
However, despite the uncertainty which accompanied the prospect of a new 
leadership in Manila, Lee had judged accurately that Marcos’ time was up. The masses 
which crowded the streets of Manila, the Church coming to the support of Aquino and 
the disintegration of AFP loyalty for Marcos, all pointed to the inevitability of Marcos’ 
downfall. Indeed, Lee backed his acumen with action and sought once again to influence 
events in Manila during the February crisis. A Singapore government press release of 
March 1986 contained the revelation by Singapore ambassador in the Philippines, Aziz 
Mahmood, tha t  during the height of the crisis in Manila, on 24 February 1986, he had, on 
behalf of the Singapore government, ‘offered the then Philippine President Ferdinand 
Marcos and his family temporary stay in Singapore w'hile he (Marcos) decided on his 
future plans.’4  ^ Marcos however, refused. Officially, the offer of political asylum was
4 ‘^ Asian Defence J o u r n a l , December 1986, p p .26-27. Lee’s perceptions of R am os and Enrile could 
have been shaped by US views on the two, especially R am os - ‘Ram os is a general com m itted  to the 
contiuance of civilian governm ent and ze is an t i-com m unis t  ... Ram os has long had the reputa tion  
am ong US experts as the only senior general in the  Philipines who could beat the com m unis ts .’ 
Added to this R am os was trained in the US. Enrile too is s taunchly  an t i-com m unist ,  and has 
vowed th a t  he will stop  the com m unists  tak ing  over.
4oM anila  T im e s , 28 February  1986.
44F ar  Eastern  Economic Review, 16 March 1986, p.23.
4 '’Asiaweek, 9 F eb ruary  1986, p.22.
A f \ .
^ Singapore G overnm ent Press Release, N o .3 8 /M ar ,  0 9 -0 /8 6 /0 3 /1 9 ,  Inform ation Division, 
M inistry  of C om m unica tions  and Inform ation, Singapore.
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extended to Marcos in order to speed his departure and thereby avoid bloodshed and civil 
war. While in all probability the official line was correct, Lee given his extensive links 
and familiarity with ‘significant officials and operatives from the agencies and front
A 7organisations that exist in the United States, would have been well aware that the
US was on the point of abandoning Marcos. Whatever the specifics of the reasoning 
behind the offer, Lee was well aware tha t  the longer the country remained in a state of 
chaos, the more advantageous the situation would have been for the communists. For 
Lee, the best possible development was to remove Marcos quickly and allow some form of 
normalcy to return to the Philippines. The alternative, namely Marcos holding grimly on 
while Filipinos divided to sow the seeds of civil war, was too horrible to contemplate. In 
such a situation, the one political party with the organisation and strength to prevail 
would have been the communists. For Singapore this would have meant the weakening of 
ASEAN and further instability in the region. The apparantly ailing Marcos was unable 
to control the situation. Lee could only trust tha t  Aquino, with the Church, Enrile and 
Ramos in support, would be able to exact a stabilizing influence. For Lee, as for 
Indonesian President Suharto, there was little choice; it was Aquino or the communists.
T h e  P h i l ip p in e s  U n d e r  A q u in o
Lee’s concern at the fragility of democracy in the Philippines was evident from the 
speed with which Singapore’s leaders established contact with the new Filipino regime. In 
April 1986, Singapore Foreign Minister Dhanabalan was the first ASEAN Foreign 
Minister to visit the Philippines following Aquino’s ascent to power. Lee, himself, paid a 
visit to the Philippines on 1 .July 1986. The aims of both visits were similar, namely, to 
promote personal ties with the new leaders; to convey Singapore’s hope that Aquino 
would allow the US military bases to remain beyond 1991, and to offer technical aid and 
assistance to the fledgling reg im e.^  Lee was also keen to gain first-hand experience of 
the situation in the Philippines, especially with regard to the communist presence.^
a n
'M inch in ,  op .c i t . , p.177.
^®See S tra its  T im es , 2 April 1986, Business T im e s , 1 Ju ly  1986, and S tra i ts  T im e s , 2 Ju ly  1986. 
Lee offered US$5 million in aid to the Philippines during his visit there.
^ Asian Wall Street J o u rn a l , 1 Ju ly  1986.
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The early visits by Lee and Dhanabalan to the Philippines generated personal 
warmth between the political elite of both countries. Sensitive to Aquino’s wishes, 
Singapore revoked its earlier offer and refused to allow Marcos political asylum when on 4 
March 1986, Marcos contacted the Singapore Ambassador Aziz Mahmood, for permission 
to stay in Singapore for a few w e e k s . F o l l o w i n g  Lee’s visit to Manila in July 1986, 
Aquino duly indicated that her priorities lay with ASEAN when she visited Indonesia and 
Singapore before going on to the US, during her First overseas t r ip .51
The exchange of visits between Lee and Aquino encouraged businessmen in their 
respective countries to enter into investment and trade agreements with each other.
r o
Aquino was especially interested in obtaining for her nation investment from Singapore.oz 
Her economic ministers were keen to sell fruit and vegetables to Singapore, rear pigs in 
the Philippines for consumption in Singapore, and to help relocate labour-intensive 
industries in the Philippines.00 Lee for his part, pointed to ‘investment opportunities in 
the Philippines.’04 Moreover, both Singapore and the Philippines appeared to be drawing 
closer in terms of wider intra-ASEAN relations. Aquino agreed to support Lee’s 
suggestion that the rule of unanimity in ASEAN be replaced by the ‘Five-minus-one’ 
principle, namely,
when four agree and one does not object, this can still be considered as 
consensus; and the four should proceed with a new regional scheme. An ASEAN 
Five-minus-one scheme can beneFit the participating four without damaging the 
abstaining one. Indeed the abstaining one may well be encouraged to join in 
later by the success of the scheme.00
In turn, Singapore was willing to support a Philippine proposal for a ‘standstill to a 
rolling back of non-tariff barriers in ASEAN.’°^
As stated earlier in this chapter, both the Philippines and Singapore although
50 •Singapore Government Press Release, op.cit.
r  i
' She began her two day stay in Singapore on 26 August 1986 after a successful visit with 
Suharto in Indonesia.
° ‘^ The Journal of Commerce, 27 August 1986.
0,>Straits Tim es, 2 July 1986.
° 4 Business Tim es, 4 July 1986.
1 1 Lau, ‘The Role of Singapore in Sout heast Asia’, op .cit. , p.39.
"^Straits Tim es, 27 August 1986.
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historically having few incentives to improve relations, experienced few, if any, disputes. 
Relations have remained generally good. The political crisis in the Philippines coupled 
with Prime Minister Lee’s concern to maintain the stability of the region and the strength 
of ASEAN, have in fact given new incentives to improving relations between Singapore 
and the Aquino regime. Lee will continue to contribute to the stabilization of the troubled 
country through economic aid and the prospect of improved trade links which, at the 
same time, would provide the most effective form of strong action which Lee would take 
against the growth of communism in the Philippines. Moreover, stabilization of the 
domestic Philippine scene would allow the Philippines to again play an active part in 
ASEAN in years to come, a development which could only serve to strengthen ASEAN. 
Thus regional resilience would be strengthened from within through national resilience. 
Internal regional strength could be augmented, and could in its turn support external 
assistance - through the continued presence of the US bases.
Thus it is somewhat ironic that the period of intense turmoil which occured in 
Manila in the early months of 1986, and which appeared to threaten the viability of 
ASEAN and the security of the region, has resulted in warmer relations between 
Singapore and the Philippines. Significantly, it was also evident tha t  contrary to its small 
size, Singapore’s leaders did try to influence events within the Philippines.
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C o n c lu s io n
A S E A N - P h i l i p p i n e  R e la t io n s
Regionalism in Southeast Asia, as manifest in ASEAN, has largely succeeded. This 
success continues largely because the concept of regionalism
vaguely defined, seems to promise different benefits to different national 
leaders. To many regionalism has meant a revival of cultural, and perhaps 
political, ties among Asian ’brothers’, long divided during the period of 
European colonialism. For many others regional cooperation has offered hope for 
a more efficient path to national economic development. To another group, 
regionalism has seemed to offer small nations a stronger guarantee of defense 
and security.*
Although Bernard Gordon arrived at this assessment before the formation of ASEAN, it 
is this reasoning which accounts in large part for the perennial attraction of the 
organisation. The changing balance of power between the great powers, China, the Soviet 
Union, and the United States, within the region; and the success of communism in 
mainland Southeast Asia, have also contributed to the survival of ASEAN. In response, 
ASEAN members have sought strength through unity against the dangers of the outside 
world. However, this thesis has been concerned with intra-ASEAN politics, particularly 
with regard to the problem of preserving internal strength during a time of political crisis 
experienced by one of its members.
The unique domestic circumstances prevalent in the Philippines, coupled with the 
strategic contribution which the nation makes to the security of the region, gives the 
Philippines immense importance in the eyes of the other ASEAN members.
In terms of domestic conditions, as noted previously, the Philippines is now the only 
ASEAN country subject to a strong and growing communist insurgency. Instability 
within the Philippines would be beneficial not only to the communists there, but also to
^Gordon, Bernard K, ‘Regionalism and Instabili ty  in Southeast A sia’, in Nye, Joseph S J r  (ed), 
In terna t iona l  Regionalism: R ead ings , (Boston. Little, Brown and Co., 1968), p p .106-107.
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interests beyond tha t  movement. Since the late 1970s, two regional groups have evolved 
in Southeast Asia, namely the non-communist ASEAN grouping and a communist bloc 
comprising the Indochinese states controlled from Hanoi. The two sides have been on less
o
than friendly terms since Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea in December 1978 / In order 
to preserve a counter-force to communist Indochina, ASEAN members have placed a 
premium on the maintenance by each of internal strength thereby achieving regional 
resilience. The growing communist movement in the Philippines was therefore, of major 
concern.
The strategic role played by the Philippines derives primarily from the 
accommodation of base facilities for US forces. A strong US presence in the region is 
supported by all ASEAN countries whose economies are tied to the Western industrialised 
countries. The increased presence of the two great communist powers in Southeast Asia 
has heightened concern among most ASEAN members. Not only is China perceived as a 
potential long-term threat to the region, the growing Soviet presence, especially within
9
Indochina, is considered by ASEAN to be undesirable/ Fear and distrust of both the 
Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent China, has led to a favourable reaction by ASEAN to 
President Reagan’s hardline foreign policy.'1 However, news of the recent political crisis in 
the Philippines was received differently in the capitals of ASEAN. For the Malaysians, a 
history of difficult bilateral relations with Marcos over the Sabah dispute and the support 
of rebel Muslim Filipinos largely determined their reaction to the downfall of Marcos and 
the ascent of Aquino. According to Malaysia, Marcos had dishonoured his promise to 
renounce the Sabah claim. Despite his verbal statement renoucing the Sabah claim in 
1977, Marcos had failed to alter the Philippine Constitution to remove the clauses 
implying Philippine ownership of Sabah. Similarly the Filipino Muslim problem had long
2van  der Kroef, op .c i t . , pp .61-62.
9
°C houdhury ,  G W, ‘ASEAN and the  C om m unist W o r ld ’, Asia Pacific C o m m u n i ty , Sum m er 
1981, p.37 and p.39. Most ASEAN sta tes  have a negative image of the Soviet Union and believe 
th a t  it poses the greatest single th rea t  to Asia today. C h ina  too has m ade few steps forward in its 
rela tions with Indonesia. Although the  civilian elements of the Indonesian governm ent react 
positively toward China, the Indonesian army still dislikes, and is suspicious of, the leadership in 
Beijing.
^T oba ,  Reijiro, ‘ASEAN F avours  R e a g a n ’s Hardline Foreign Policy’, Asia Pacific C o m m u n i ty , 
W in te r  1981, p.55-68.
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been a source of acrimony between Malaysia and the Philippines. Both countries at times 
used the issue as a bargaining chip for their own ends - Malaysia, to force the Philippines 
to drop the Sabah claim in return for an end to aid for the Filipino Muslims; and the 
Philippines raising the Muslim issue everytime Malaysia demanded it renounce its claim. 
As recently as 1981, in response to Prime Minister M ahathir’s announcement that he 
would not visit the Philippines until Manila formally renounced its claim to Sabah, 
Defence Minister Enrile again alleged that Malaysia was continuing to provide bases for 
rebel Filipino Muslims. Ultimately, both Sabah and the Muslim rebel disputes resulted in 
a favourable reaction in Kuala Lumpur to the rise of Aquino. Although Malaysians knew 
little of the new leader, her husband's reputation, especially toward Sabah, her initially 
conservative attitude toward the US bases and her astute alignment with the conservative 
opposition leader Salvador Laurel, stood her immediately in good favour. The Malaysians 
really saw that they had nothing to lose from Marcos’ downfall especially if Aquino was 
to take over. Although they hoped that the Sabah dispute would finally be resolved, even 
if it was not, relations between the two countries could not be any worse.
Indonesia’s reaction to the events of early 1986 was governed less by considerations 
which might directly affect bilateral relations between Manila and Jakarta. Although past 
pragmatic and antagonistic relations had existed between the two, Indonesian concern 
focussed primarily on possible ramifications for its own political stability and the 
preservation of the regional balance of power. Indonesian dislike for the type of popular 
movement which occured in Manila can be traced back to the demonstrations which 
occurred in Jakarta  during the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka in 1974; 
demonstrations which were perceived to have been inspired by a ‘spill-over’ effect from 
student demonstrations in Thailand during the previous year. Jakar ta  was concerned 
tha t  its economic recession, due largely to its vulnerablility to fallen oil prices, would be 
compared to the Philippines economic disaster, with a resultant upsurge in similarly 
‘revolutionary’ demonstrations against the government. Indonesia also feared tha t  the 
communist movement in the Philippines would gain an advantage in the instability and 
would also be able to exploit Aquino’s policy of negotiation with their leaders. Indonesian 
experience with communists suggested that instability and negotiation with the
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communists could only lead to their victory in the Philippines. Should this occur, Clarke 
Field and Subic Bay would be lost and the delicate balance between the region’s 
communist and non-communist blocs would be upset. Chapter Two of this thesis outlined 
the concern tha t  Jakarta  had to counter the growing Soviet presence with a solid regional 
commitment to American strategy in the region. Despite its non-aligned status, 
Indonesian trade and investment is strongly linked to the West. With no apparent 
alternative to Marcos, Suharto demonstrated his support of the dictator two months prior 
to the elections by offering Indonesian transport planes for use against the insurgency. It 
is clear, however, that following the reunification of the democratic opposition forces in 
Manila, Suharto realised tha t  he could do nothing more to help. Indeed, there was no 
further indication of a desire to do so. Aquino was far from being a communist or even 
anti-American. Where Marcos had patently failed to control the domestic situation, the 
Aquino camp might well stem both communist and anti-American sentiment in the 
Philippines.
For slightly different reasons again, the leadership in Singapore was closely 
concerned about a possible ‘spill-over effect. Economic conditions in Singapore were 
much better than in either Jakarta  or the Philippines. Moreover, the internal situation in 
Singapore was tightly controlled by the PAP leadership. Singapore was therefore more 
anxious about the potential for regional instability. Singapore’s geographic, demographic 
and economic limitations had made the country extremely vulnerable to external 
disruption. Instability in Southeast Asia could lead to a loss of investor confidence in the 
region. Regional communist powers might take advantage of such instability to 
exacerbate that climate of lost confidence and turmoil. Lee was also worried about the 
US bases in the Philippines. He strove to prevent such a possibility. Lee was at the time, 
and remains, a figure of influence in international affairs; influence which extends beyond 
tha t  which would normally be assigned to a state  of comparable small size. Through his 
access to US officials, Lee both received and offered advice. In October 1985, he consulted 
with Reagan. He had some influence in the decision to send Paul Laxalt to Manila to see 
Marcos. Lee attempted to influence the course of events in Manila after the election 
results. On 24 February 1986, in a bid to end the instability that gripped the nation, Lee
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offered Marcos political asylum. Marcos refused. It, was Lee, more than any other ASEAN 
leader who embraced Aquino as an alternative  to  Marcos; all the more so since she had a t 
her side two s taunch  an ti-com m unist ,  pro-American conservatives, namely Enrile and 
Ramos.
Of the three ASEAN countries seen to  be most involved with the Philippine 
political crisis, only M alaysia  had bilateral problems with the Philippines which 
influenced its reaction to  the February  ‘revolu tion1. Singapore and Indonesia shared a 
predom inan t concern for the regional ramifications of the crisis, bu t  here again 
perceptions differed. While Indonesian concern arose from its perception th a t  South East 
Asia was its sphere of influence, Singapore was concerned because its survival depended 
on the preservation of political s tability  in the region. While Indonesia and Singapore 
were s trongest in their support  for a  continued US presence in the region, all three sta tes  
could perceive th a t  continued instability in the Philippines th rea tened  to undermine the 
very foundations of ASEAN.
However, despite their varying degrees of concern, and despite piecemeal action by 
some, none of the  th ree could act decisively to  control events in the Philippines. As a 
regional en ti ty ,  the m em bers of ASEAN adopted a ‘wait and see’ a t t i tu d e  and said little, 
even when M arcos proclaimed himself victor on 14 February. Asiaweek reported th a t  the 
Singapore Foreign M inister D hanabalan  had noted th a t
‘all of us in ASEAN are concerned1 but th a t  ‘from all accounts, it appears th a t  
i t ’s going to  take  some time before things stabilise, and it is something 
w orry ing .1 In M alaysia, Foreign Minister Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen said his 
country  was ‘m onitoring the situation but would not send an envoy ... no 
congra tu la to ry  message had been sent ...’ Indonesian Foreign Minister M ochtar 
K u su m aa tm ad ja  could only say th a t  ’We are continuing to  observe 
developm ents th e re ' .0
The nation of greatest influence on Philippine affairs remained the United States. 
Perhaps the realization of this fact by the ASEAN sta tes  was reflected in their inaction as 
a  regional grouping until the final stages of the crisis. It was only on 23 February 1986 
th a t  ASEAN issued a jo in t  s ta tem en t of concern:
As m em ber s ta tes  of ASEAN, Brunei D arussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia,
° Asiaweek, 2 M arch 1986, p.13.
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Singapore, and Thailand have followed with increasing concern the turn of 
events following the presidential elections in the Philippines.
A critical situation has emerged which portends bloodshed and civil war.
The crisis can be resolved without widespread carnage and turmoil. We call on 
all parties to restore national unity and solidarity so as to maintain national 
resilience.
There is still time to act with restraint and bring about a peaceful resolution 
of the crisis^.
It is perhaps ironic tha t  while individual leaders like Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew
could seek to influence events in the Philippines, ASEAN the organisation could do no
more than issue a joint sta tem ent of concern. ASEAN as a regional organisation was
relegated to the sidelines. Marcos did not seek advice from ASEAN and looked more to
the US for support. In fact it was on Reagan’s word that the dictator finally acquiesced
and abandoned the country. All ASEAN could do was watch and wait upon the outcome
of events that were beyond its control. There was no institutional framework within
ASEAN to bring to bear on such a crisis. Indeed, it was the US again that strove to make
Marcos and Aquino compromise in a power-sharing solution. If such was to be the
quality of the ‘solutions’ imposed on the Philippines from without, perhaps it was just as
well tha t  ASEAN lacked the means to intervene. Perhaps also it wras evident to the
member states tha t  the creation of such machinery would have established a dangerous
precedent, introducing the potential for future unrest within ASEAN. Significant
differences and suspicions persist between ASEAN states due both to traditional
7animosities and the more recent nationalistic demands of each as modern states.
Ultimately, however, no ASEAN state was seriously dismayed by Aquino. She 
placed ASEAN as a high priority in Philippine foreign policy, visiting Indonesia and 
Singapore before the US and Japan. ASEAN has since settled down to the state of 
vigilant calm which reigned before the Philippine crisis; a crisis which only served to 
illustrate the internal weakness of an organisation that is recognised to be one of the most 
united and active in the international arena.
^ S tra its  Times 26 February  1986.
"A S E A N  is made more vulnerable by the lack of economic and t rade  ties th a t  each country has 
with o ther  members. This aspect is unlikely to change in t he 1980s. See van der Kroef, op .c it . , p.65.
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